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# MARS IN CATHEDRA

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## LEZINGEN

Op 12 november 1996 heeft de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap (KVBK) samen met de Atlantische Commissie een bijeenkomst georganiseerd met als thema: 'Fighting terrorism. The battle of the future?' De wereldberoemde auteur en historicus prof. dr. M. van Creveld, verbonden als hoogleraar aan de Hebrew University, verzorgde de inleiding.

Luitenant-generaal J. Miller, plaatsvervangend commandant van het Amerikaanse Training and Doctrine Command, was de inleider van een bijeenkomst met als thema: 'The armed forces: the next generation!'. Deze eveneens door de KVBK georganiseerde bijeenkomst vond plaats op 24 september 1996 in het Defensie Voorlichting Centrum.


Velen van u verzochten om een kopie van de tekst van deze lezingen. De KVBK is dan ook verheugd dat ze met de bewerkingen van beide voordrachten, die u hieronder aantreft, aan uw verzoek heeft kunnen voldoen.

## 'FIGHTING TERRORISM, THE BATTLE OF THE FUTURE'

Prof. dr. M. van Creveld

Dank u mijnheer de voorzitter, dames en heren goedenavond. Het is voor mij een plezier en ook een eer om hier te zijn in Nederland, het land waar ik geboren ben, maar ik wil u mijn Nederlands niet aan doen. Dat is een straf die u niet verdient.

So please ladies en gentlemen let me switch to English and again let me tell you how delighted I am to be back in the country of my birth, and talking to you.



*Prof. dr. M. van Creveld*

Perhaps the way to start is with a story. This afternoon I also started with a story. This is a different story, I assure those who were there. I go to the Staff College in Camberley each year to talk to the Higher Command Staff Course, and some years ago I was sitting there with a colonel, he was very worried about his future. Because all he was seeing was cuts, cuts, cuts and God what am I going to do. So I told him, well it is very simple, get into the security business. It is booming.

So we were sitting in this magnificent dining-room in Camberley, and I don't know whether you are familiar with it, it is a country house, it was build for the duke of Cambridge last century, and he gave it to the Staff College. This house got oak-panelling, and it has got oil-pictures of the queen and all the princes and so on, on the walls. It has got silver cutlery and silver statues on the tables, you know, of horses and brave British soldiers. And white apron girls to serve the excellent, excellent food, and four glasses of wine with each plate.

So this colonel whom I just told to get out and go into the security business looks around and says; "but that is nasty."

And of course he is right. You cannot answer that, it is true.

It is nasty, ladies and gentlemen, but unfortuna-

tely I believe it is the future.

This afternoon I will talk for 45 minutes as to about why I think this is the future, and I am not going to repeat myself.

Let me only say that in my view, and if you do want to go into this later on, it is OK, but let me just sum up that in my view the age of major wars between states is coming to an end.

It may already has ended, but I would not go that far, you never know how backward the military mind can be. There is always the possibility of some anachronism taking place.

The future belongs to terrorism. The future belongs to guerrilla. The future belongs to insurgency. The future belongs to low intensity conflicts. The future belongs to what I prefer to call "long trinity tidal war", because in these wars the classic distinction between government, armed forces and people does not exist.

Instead, they are all mixed up together. Which is one vision why they are so bloody. Because 90 percent of those who die are civilians.

It may be nasty, but it is the future. And to prevent it of becoming the future, we must think about it carefully.

Now to judge by the record of the last fifty or so years, people have not been thinking about it seriously. In fact it is hard to think of any low intensity conflict around the world – including of course the two that you fought in your own former colonies – in which modern regular armed forces such as the Dutch, but also such as the British, French, the American, the Soviet, the Indian, the Vietnamese and Israelian, of course have not been defeated.

Our record in handling this kind of thing has been absolutely invisible. Let us be honest, this is a room with no important people I think, no very important people listening, no political implications. Our record in doing this kind of thing has been terrible, it has been much beneath critique. We just do not know how to do it. We have been going from one defeat to the next with hardly any exception.

### **Excuses**

And then of course you can hear the excuses. It was very far away as in your case or the French in Indo-China, and so an already expensive war turned into a financial black hole. True enough, but on the other hand I did not see regular forces do much better when the insurgency was on their own doorstep. For instance the Indians in Sri Lanka, or in Casmir if you will. The Soviets in Afghanistan, those places were not far away, and yet there to: counter-insurgency failed. Then there is the usual blaming the politicians.

The great expert on this is of course Harry Sumner, in *On strategy*. The politicians didn't do it right. They didn't tell us exactly what they wanted. They changed their objectives. They were not focused. They betrayed us. They stabbed us in the back.

Well, let me just remind you that in 1964 I was 18 years old at the time when the incident at Pungkin which really started the Vietnam war took place. And I can well remember the cover on Newsweek magazine, "the heroes of Pungkin." Originally the American public was solid behind the war. Within two years however, they were against it. How did it happen? Why did it happen?

And then there is the excuse which we hear very often, in Israel to, yes we have been fighting with two hands or one hand tied behind our back. If you really allowed us to do what we are capable of doing, if we had not been bound by moral consideration, then we would easily have won.

Well again, ladies and gentlemen, I do not think that is correct. I think it is an excuse. Some of these wars were so deadly that they approached genocide. And still they were lost.

### **Immorality**

In Vietnam US dropped six millions tons of bombs, three times as many as were dropped on Germany and Japan together, in World War II. Millions of people were killed. Entire areas were defoliated, through chemical warfare. How ruthless can you be? This was not war, this was close to genocide. The same was true for the Russians, the Soviets in Afghanistan. The same according to some sources was true for the French in Algeria, if you believe the French, 300 people died, if you believe the Algerians: 1 million people died.

As against, if I remember right, about 5000 Frenchmen, but I maybe wrong.

It is not a question of waiting who is next. Why does it happen?

The real truth is, to my mind of course – who am I to present the objective truth – the real reason for loosing is that what we have been doing is immoral.

Which explains ladies and gentlemen why in all those wars with hardly one exception, the number of insurgents who died, who became casualties exceeded that of the security forces who died or became casualties by a factor of ten to one, fifty to one, a hundred to one. And still in the end it was the security forces that broke.

The other day I was working, I am working now on the history of the Israeli army, so I was interested in British counterinsurgency in Palestine. I checked how many casualties they suffered in those 3 years from 1945 to 1948 before they gave up and withdrew. About 200 dead, in 3 years mind you, that is about 1 dead every 5 days, right? More then 1 a week.

Not nearly as many as they suffered in one night of Blitz, in one major battle in WW II. And yet at the end of less then 3 years, actually less then 2 years before the British government made the decision. But it took them another year to get out.

In less then two years they gave up and went home.

Why? Because they had been defeated. Not physically, morally.

It is the morality, the immoral character of these wars that caused them to loose public support. Wars which started by having all the support in the world – as the case in Algeria, as the case of Vietnam – ended up by loosing support. Because they were immoral.

Now ladies and gentlemen, who am I to say what is immoral? I am not authorized, you are not, nobody is.

In these things I am a follower of Nietzsche, and to the extent that I understand him – I talked to him a couple of years but that does not really mean much -- morality is not governed by ends, morality is governed by means. It is not the ends that people fight for that are either moral or immoral, it is the means.

A struggle becomes immoral, regardless of what these ends are and the ends may be the best and the most justified in the world and maybe the American ends in Vietnam were justified, and maybe our ends or our government ends in these territories are justified.

Who am I to say?

If any of you were attacked by a five year old child, even a five year old child with a knife. And your reacted by killing that child, then you would be put on trial, and condemned, and I think all of us would agree with reason.

Because the judge would have said this was not necessary. You were strong, he was weak. Therefore even though your objectives may have been good, what you did was immoral. It is the balance of forces which create morality. You cannot be strong and moral at the same time.

And we were strong when we sought victory, this is why these struggles were lost. In the end not because of military factors, organisation,

technology, whatever, although God knows there have been blunders, but for moral reasons. Because what we were trying to do was wrong, and again let me repeat, it was wrong not because of the objectives but because of the balance of forces. To the devil with the objectives, who cares about them.

### **Acts of Brutality**

When I am talking about these kind of things, one factor that is absolutely critical is the role of time. One act of brutality is OK, acts of brutality, even minor ones, endlessly repeated will lead to the disintegration of any armed force. To quote Sun Zsu, "A sword swashed into salt water will rust". It is only a question of time. Obviously how fast this will happen depends on how salty the water is, and how good the sword. But a sword swashed into salt water will rust.

One act of brutality is OK, sometimes necessary, on this my guide is Machiavelli, who lays down the rules for the use of brutality, with a couple of good examples too.

Number 1: Do it quickly and with all possible force so that it is over with.

Number 2: Do it in public, so that the rest of the world be warned.

Number 3: Make sure that somebody else does it for you so you can ignore him if necessary.

We in our counter-insurgency wars have systematically violated all three rules. Always, always, always.

A single act of brutality may be terrible, but at least once it is done, it is done. You can go one, you can carry on.

A very good example is president Assad in Hamas, back in 1982. At that time terrorism was growing in Syria, president Assad and his army literally wiped out the centre of the city of Hamas, and turned it into a parking lot. And blew up the great mosque.

And I am told that to this day people when they pass the place where the great mosque used to be they look away. And they shiver, which is good.

Brutality is sometimes necessary when you are facing a problem of this sort, and it may be effective. However, I know these are nasty things to talk about.

But I did not come here to talk about "koetjes and kalfjes" as they say in Dutch.

An act of brutality may be necessary and may work. Let me give you another example.

Back in april, we Israeli's dropped down 13.000

rounds of artillery on a town in Lebanon. One of those 13.000 went astray, landed among a 100 refugees and killed them.

It was a tragedy. We should have dealt with it completely different.

We should not have apologised, we should not have set up a committee of inquiry. We should not, we should not. We should have said "God-damn it, we did it because it was absolutely necessary and if necessary we will do it again".

Then it might have done some good. As it was, it only did bad, and mr. Perez of course lost the elections and without mr. Perez I am afraid prospects for peace have been postponed.

It is however a risky strategy. Because it may not work. And if it does not work, then you end up in a war situation and you started it.

They will hate you in any case more then before, but at least if you succeed they will keep quiet, because they are afraid.

But if you do not succeed then of course the fact is really on fire.

So it is a risky strategy, whether or not to take it, is a difficult decision.

I am not here to tell you, to draw up a catalog, under which circumstances and how it should be taken or not taken, and anyhow I believe that such a catalog, even if it could be drawn up, would only end in an absurd way.

### **The long struggle**

So let me therefore leave this strategy, which is one possibility, and turn to the other one. Assuming then that you do not go for a spectacular act of brutality, and that you go for the long struggle.

Then the real problem is how to prevent your forces from becoming demoralized.

Two years ago I was speaking to the Israelian General Staff, and one of the generals, our present minister of Defence, at one point during the discussion asked: "but how on earth do we keep the motivation up", a very good question.

And it is the question on which everything else depends.

Provided we can maintain the motivation, both among the military and among the public, then there need be no defeat. All those defeats were suffered because motivation broke up.

How then do we keep people motivated?

Well, first of all, by making sure that what they do is not morally wrong, because ladies and gentlemen, nobody will lay down his life for a course that is morally wrong. And rightly so.

It is not a question of what you fight for, but how you fight, and with what.

So if you go for a long struggle then the answer

is that you have to be extremely deliberately restrained. How extreme and how deliberate? What you want to avoid at all costs is a situation whereby your troops will be facing a smaller opponent and beating down on him time after time, after time, after time, after time. Because that is immoral and that will cause you to disintegrate.

To quote Nietzsche on this: "Nothing is more boring than a victory forever repeated". People in the world of sport know that. That is why they juggle around their teams in such a way that each time there be some other strong team coming up. If it was the same team winning all the time, people would lose interest and go home.

So it is a question of deliberately restraining yourself to the point that you will not have the situation of the strong beat down the weak. Of not using all your force, of not doing all you can, of not going all out, of not trying to do things fast.

What kind of forces do you need for these kind of things ?

#### **Kinds of force**

You really need four kinds of force, I think.

You need first of all good neighbourhood watchers, volunteers, vigilantes, right? People who will be willing and able to help defend a tall guard watch, the places where they live.

Second you will need military and police patrols, and I have already argued this morning and afternoon, that in the future the military and the police are going to merge into each other, so it does not really matter whether we are talking military or police.

Last year, or rather earlier this year I was in Paris, in January, I have never seen so many troops on the streets as in Paris in January. Never in my life, not even in Jerusalem. This of course was the time of the Muslim bombs. Whether the police or military who cares that they wear the same machineguns.

So, second you need military patrols.

Third you will need intelligence, and fourth you will need a strike unit, rapid reaction. I go over those one by one very briefly.

#### *The popular forces*

The role of the popular forces is to provide a modicum of security, as well as early warning, alert. When something happens, there must be somebody there to alert you, and to know what to do during the first minutes. Also they are needed

in order to provide background reporting on anything unusual. Constantly available.

These neighbourhood-watchers, vigilantes, whatever, are easily penetrated by the terrorist, therefore be on your guard, you need counter-intelligence.

#### *The military or police patrols*

Second the military or police patrols, their role is similar to that of the popular watch, but they are more mobile and they are trained and more heavily armed. And yet they must be organized, trained and operated in such a way that they will come to know the places which they patrol very, very intimately. So that they can notice anything unusual is going on, and also so that they can build an intimate relationship of trust with the local population.

Therefore, they will presumably have to go on foot or by bicycle, in this country. Once they use cars, especially armoured cars, they will be out of touch and not able to know what is going on.

#### *Intelligence*

A third element will be intelligence. In this kind of war the role of intelligence cannot be over-estimated. One critical reason why the Americans lost Vietnam was because they could not even speak the language, and they obviously were short on intelligence. The same was true although to a lesser extent in Palestine. The British lost there, because they were short of intelligence and they were short of intelligence because they were very short on people who spoke Hebrew, where as Jews would rarely if ever betray other Jews awaiting.

Intelligence will partly be covered, it will be gained mainly by ordinary police measures, tactical measures including of course penetrating the enemy.

#### *The strike forces*

Finally, the strike units. We are talking about specialized, high quality units which will be standing ready to strike in order to react to a situation that arises out of intelligence or opportunities that intelligence wants to.

These people must be very highly trained, they must be real elite, they must be very mobile, they must be equipped with everything that is necessary to perform their mission quickly and efficiently. To defuse-bombs, take care of kidnappings, hostage rescue, arrests, et cetera.

Yet there is a catch here, they too must somehow be kept in touch with the rest of the campaign. Nothing, but nothing is more demoralizing to ordinary troops, than to see a group of elite robotics climb in, do whatever they came to do and fly out again.

That is one of the mistakes we have been making in South-Lebanon.

In the South of Lebanon we are currently fighting 2 wars. One by ordinary units which are stationed there for several weeks, and get under fire every now and then, or get blown up by the Hezbollah. And another of those supposedly elite units. Who get all the privileges and all the glory, for flying in, doing whatever they do, and then fly out.

Not many scenes can be more demoralizing than these dual wars and this separation between the two types of units.

So, elite units of this kind can present a problem in themselves.

The question is how do you use them correctly, with the right mixture, without letting them get off the hook. And I am told that in Somalia the American special forces went off their hook and that is how they lost the campaign. I have been told that several times.

So, what you absolutely need is strike forces. On the other hand you must make sure that they do not become an elite which is isolated in the campaign, because nothing, I repeat: nothing, can be more demoralizing for the rest of the troops.

### **Command, Control and Communication**

The whole thing has to be tight together by a very good command, control and communication system, obviously.

But there is a problem here. One reason why terrorism I think is so successful, is precisely because this kind of gadget can also be purchased by the terrorist. It is available off the shelf.

During the Intifada there were times when the journalists arrived on the scene before the Israeli army. And not only because they had been invited. (Often they had been invited, "Look we are going to mount a demonstration, come and take pictures for CNN".)

But that was not the only reason.

Another reason was that the IDF was using such and such communication gear. That communication gear, is not so expensive that journalists and terrorists too cannot afford it.

So there is a problem here. On the one hand you need a very good command and communication system, on the other hand that very system also represents a weakness. And in our case it often was.

There is only one way to overcome these kind of problems, and that is such good training and such good organisation that you can do without too much communication, because people will have worked with each other, operated with

each other, lived with each other, long enough to understand each other without having to ask long complicated and detailed messages on the radio.

Which in turn has interesting implications for manpower-policy for the nation, but I will not go into detail about that.

### **Opposite Polarity**

Let me try to sum up.

The real reason why all the wars have been lost, has nothing to do in my view with lack of focus, or with any other excuses that people found.

The real reasons are moral. It is not nice to hold up any war, say what we have been doing is immoral.

How do you deal with this ?

Two ways: and of course I am talking opposite polarity. Reality is bound to be more difficult.

Either an act of spectacular brutality, that will put an end to it, but if you choose that strategy, then do not apologize for your acts, and carry it out to the end. And it will work, but it is risky, because if it does not work, you are going to find yourself in a worse situation than in the beginning.

Then if you have decided not to go for that, then the motto must be: patience and restraint. Do not respond to provocation. Minimize casualties, on both side, not only on your doorstep, on the other one too.

I got a little story about that.

First time I went to Camberley, I went to London in the evening to a theatre, I came back by train that night. It was one of these English fogs. So, I was wandering around the compound and I was not very familiar with it, and like some sort of character in the stories of the brothers Grimm, I saw a light.

I go to the light and there comes a house out of the fog, and I knock on the door and who opens the door if not the commanding general in his socks. And he knows me and he invites me in and we have a glass of whisky to drink and then he shows me all the eight books he is reading at the same time, and then he tells me: "You know what my next job is going to be"?

I am going to be the Commander in Chief British Forces Northern Ireland. And he says: "Look these people have been killing each other for the last 800 years. No way I can stop it with my troops, all I can do is to try and make sure that as few people as possible get killed. On my side, but at least as important, maybe more important, on their side".

Which I thought, then and I still think, was a very sensitive thought.

The figures about that campaign, I promised

you to give you some statistics, well here they are. The figures will speak for themselves. Over the last 20/30 years there have been about 3000 dead, over the struggle in Northern Ireland. Of those 3000 approximately 1700 were civilian. Who were blown-up, or caught in cross-fire, and things like that. So in a way, true as it sounds, they do not count.

The really interesting figure as comparison is between the number of security people killed and the number of terrorist killed. Anybody knows the figure?

I was astonished to learn them myself from a British colonel, who served there many times, it turned out that of 1300 people killed, only 300 were terrorists. 1000 were security – 3 times as much. This is the only conflict of its kind in which this relationship exists, therefore this is

the only struggle of its kind which has not become immoral, because of this exemplary restrained, professionalised, disciplined police. And of course I am as familiar as you are with the Birmingham 6, and in the name of the father and so on, and I am well aware that there has been some brutalities.

But as the figure shows, after thirty years of these kind of things the British are still there. If necessary they can keep it up forever. They may not be able to win, but at least they need not loose.

And that is a hell of a lot better than most of us have been able to do, and obviously the only way whenever you do not have a politic solution.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for listening.

## 'THE ARMED FORCES: THE NEXT GENERATION!'

J. Miller

I appreciate this opportunity to be here with many distinguished officers from my past experience – General Wilpink in particular – it's indeed an honour to you and the audience this evening. And for those of you that are from other professional backgrounds, whether it's a political background or the media or whatever, it's a privilege to talk with all of you. Appreciate you being here this evening.

I will try to tell you a little bit about what we are doing as we find our way into the future, as the army of the US looks to the future.

We have taken one approach of several that are available to us.

One can look to the future in perhaps at least three different ways.

One can take the historic perspective, examine all the lessons of the past and try to draw from those lessons of the past to extend these ideas into the future.

One can take the point of view of the programmer and stand where you are today, look at your military budget, know what you are planning to buy for the next five years, and think one year at the time for five years in the future.

We have chosen a third alternative way, and that is to move out as far as we can imagine, to a

point in the future perhaps 2010 or 2050. Stand on a mountaintop in our mind, and look around us and try to see what we can see. As to the possibilities of an army at that point in the future.

Then to try to describe what would be our vision and what the possibilities. And then work and pull ourselves to that point of view.

It's a very different approach of moving into the future for our army.

### **Army XXI**

I will talk to you in the following sequence:

- about why we are moving to an army using the process of Force XXI to move us to an army we are calling 'Army XXI';
- what is different about it;
- how we will fight;
- what some of the emerging insights are; and
- the way ahead.

### *Changing Threats*

First of all, the changing dynamics in the world you all are very much aware of these. You are, but I think our reaction has been one of disinterest. We see that the pace of competition increases, although the threats in the classic sense are very unvigorous, we don't know where they are going to come from, we don't know exactly the nature of them, we do recognize that potential adversaries have free access to these free sources and technologies, which can be applied in war-fighting situations, combat situations or in crisis and conflicts that are not necessarily combat to the full extend, but certainly can be of importance to us.

And that countries with money can go into the

international market-place and they can buy technology.

We also believe that most potential adversaries might not develop in a fully balanced way, we say we are concerned about a-symmetric modernisation of a capability of some potential bad boys.

Ambiguous threats that we don't know exactly which nations or which groups might be potential adversaries in the future, nor do we fully understand what kind of technologies they might bring to the battlefield. Clearly they may come with a technology that was developed with a certain warfighting doctrine in mind as that technology was developed, and they may apply it in a totally unique way, in what we would call a 'non-doctrinal' or 'non-traditional' approach. That creates some wild challenges for us.

#### *Technological Opportunities*

We see that there is a real technical opportunity. We have changed our military strategy to move most of our forces back to the US. We are very much involved in the projection of power to places of crises around the world, as supposed to having a large military force in a forward presence, for example Europe.

And so as we look at all of this, we say that we must prepare ourselves in terms of capability, not in terms of direct preparation for a specific threat.

For many years we were certain we prepared to fight the Soviet Union in Central Europe. That is no longer the case, but we must have some military capabilities to serve our neighbours.

#### *Power Projection*

A couple of other things that are at work is the change in I think the technical opportunities throughout to power projection.

In the past when we thought about warfighting in Central Europe, our objective was to mass combat power, at a appropriate place on the battlefield, with the significant military capabilities that were built for it.

Our doctrinal concept for doing this was called 'air-land battle'. And we would focus the capabilities of all of these different types of military forces: artillery, armour, back-aviation, our air force/air-support to an engagement area to achieve an overwhelming effect in that specific location on the battlefield.

#### *Full-dimensional Operations*

As we move into the future we see all the mix-full operations as one of the kind of possibilities for us.

For our objective is to affect the enemy in as many locations as we can, from widely dispersed and sometimes distant locations. We may be massing effects, not in space but in time, or perhaps in space and in time, this depends on the situation.

In the ideal circumstance I would like to, as we did for example in operation *Just Cause* (1989), where we were able to attack 27 separate targets simultaneously, so that the enemies command and control capability of their reserve forces, their ability to respond in any way was mutually paralysed for a period of time, because we attacked in many different locations simultaneously.

#### *Historic Approach*

As we fit all these ideas together, and I will talk a little bit more about this, we are trying to create from many pieces and many ideas a picture called Army XXI.

One of the things that strikes us in the world as we look at it is that the historic approach feeding our battlefield requirements and response to our strategic requirements has changed. In the historic approach we would go through the process of the diplomats in their striped pants, cocktail-coats and tall black hats, talking about an international crisis, trying to arrive at a solution in a diplomatic way.

And when that would fail they would call upon the military forces to offer a strategic solution.

Commander in Chief of whatever theatre, would be given the mission to arrive at a strategic solution of the problem, he would develop war-plans which would be divided in operational terms of operational art, and those war-plans would be given to the tactical commanders of the divisions and corps into developed air-tactical plans for implementation.

In the historic approach we had time to plan and we had time to pack.

#### *The Present World*

As we look at the present world environment, what we see, and I choose as example a recent operation which we have done in Haiti, were we had diplomatic activity, strategic decision making, operational level decision making, tactical level decision making, all occurring in a near simultaneous way.

We had the former president of the US, Jimmy Carter, senator Sam Nunn, retired general – former chairman of the joint chiefs – Colin Powell, all in Haiti talking to general Sarras (the leader of the Haitian nation).

At the same time we had military forces on an aircraft carrier – army forces on a navy aircraft

carrier, which is a bit unique - we had the 82nd airborne at Ft Bragg preparing to move out. In fact the 82nd airborne was already moving toward Haiti in their airplanes.

We had two plans:

One plan was that we would use force if required to kick down the door, then come in with forces to stabilize the situation and to try to provide a peace-keeping type environment.

What in fact happened during the negotiations, General Hughes Shelton sitting on board a navy ship off-shore, was watching simultaneously the diplomatic process, was engaged in discussions with the national commander about the strategic nature of what was to be done, and he was making operational decisions, which he was passing on to his subordinate tactical commanders. All within minutes and hours of one another.

General Powell remarked about the influence of the information technology in the media, after all of this was concluded, that he was somewhat stung, when he walked into Sadrass office, he saw general Sadras looking at CNN on the television in his office, and on that television he saw, general Powell saw, his own back as he walked into the room.

Real-time information!

And we cannot overlook the power of the media and the influence of the media in the decision-making process.

#### *The future*

So as we look to the future we recognize that military commanders are going to be operating in this environment of diplomatic processes, strategic processes, operational decision making and tactical decision making and all of these are occurring in a near simultaneous way, and it is at this location not just merely the tactical and the operational location that the military commander is going to take as primary issue.

- 1 quality soldiers;
- 2 properly, professionally educated officers and NCO's;
- 3 a doctrine which is sensible, which will frame for us how we intend to fight;
- 4 a training programme which teaches our units, our soldiers and our leaders how to employ the technologies and the concepts for how we will fight;
- 5 the right mix of forces, active and reserve components, the right mix of branches within our army and the right mix with our joint services and our coalition partners;
- 6 adequately modern equipment, of course this is the expensive part.

The army that we are trying to develop, from the trained and ready army that we have today, will be an army that is based upon the following plain six imperatives.

Where as we move from here to here, keeping these six imperatives in balance is offly important to us, and I will develop that idea a little bit further.

#### *Army XXI - Operational Capabilities*

As we think about the army of the 21st century, and the kinds of operational capabilities we must have, we look at the recent operations that we have been involved in - and there have been many since the end of the Cold War - in an operational tempo since we are much busier now than we were before the end of the Cold War. In terms of the numbers and types of missions.

#### *Kuwait*

As we look at Kuwait we see that we had to apply this idea of operational agility, our ability to rapidly move forces to that location, to be prepared for a quick response.

Now this is Kuwait after *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, Saddam Hussein raised some concerns there, we were able to respond rather quickly because of some equipment we had afloat. We flew the soldiers in to man that equipment, we were able to put a brigade on the floor really quickly.

#### *Haiti*

You see in the operation in Haiti, we put a light infantry division on an aircraft carrier with helicopters.

The purpose of the aircraft carrier is not typically to carry army divisions around with helicopters on. We adapted that particular situation.

In *Desert Storm* and in *Just Cause* we condapted full-dimensional operations, where we were attacking simultaneously multiple targets of different types which paralysed enemy capability so that our ground forces could finish their job.

#### *Somalia*

In Somalia we saw a great deal of doctrinal flexibility, where tactical units were called on to do a wide variety of different types of missions from humanitarian support to working with non-governmental organisations throughout, to providing security to non-governmental organisations.

#### *Florida*

In Florida where we assisted with the efforts to restore order after hurricane *Andrew* a few years ago. Again we saw a great doctrinal flexibility.

We saw tactical commanders taking tactical units and using them for humanitarian support, in ways that they were never designed to, but we found them very adaptive to that situation.

Another aspect of doctrinal flexibility in these situations is, how do you know when you have won? How do you know when it is, your military operation is finished and it's time to leave? The commander in Florida decided that he would declare victory after the schools were reopened, and this became the focus of the energy of the military units, and of the civilian agencies that were working with the military units, but you must have some intakes, some objectives in mind. And it is not typical for military units you know, we normally think about taking the hill.

And clearly Bosnia is a great example of it.

#### *Multinational Coalition*

We see future warfare involving all the services: army, navy, air force and marine corps working together. Certainly multinational coalition as bedrock how we will operate in the future, and we see a lot more inter-agency involvement both from governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies. Actually those operations that are not fit to finance combat situation. But as we examine all of these we come to four key points:

that the capabilities we must have for our army in the 21st century: must allow us to compel an enemy when required. To do what we believe that that enemy must do, surrender; get out of the way; or whatever.

Because of our well-organized, well-trained armed forces we can deter any enemy.

We must be able to move in and support our friends and allies to reassure them, because of our capabilities, that we are there to help them and then we must be able to support in terms of humanitarian fleet.

This is the range of capabilities that we believe that we must have as we move to the future.

#### **Army XXI – What is different?**

Now to move ourselves to this future we began on three separate actions.

First we looked at our army with the political and physical pressures to make the army smaller. We recognized that we must downsize, re-engineer the army, reduce the amount of overhead in our headquarters and try to retain as many troops in the operational units as we possibly could.

We have a whole set of activities toward the designing of the institutional side of the army, i.e.

things like the army headquarters, the army's training and doctrine command of which I am a part, and our general objective is to bring these organisations down by at least 25 percent, we are well on the road to that.

We have the mission of redesigning the tactical army. The commander of the training and doctrine command has the responsibility for leading this particular access for the entire army.

Our view is to redesign the tactical army, begin implementing in the year 2000 a complete infantry division, implementing the changes about the year 2010. And applying information technology integrated both in the redesign of the tactical army and to enable us to redesign the institutional army as well.

So there is a separate access for bringing on information technologies, but there is a great deal of horizontal integration between all three of these axes.

I focus the rest of my comments on the work we are doing to redesign the tactical army. For that I am talking about the corps, the division, the brigade and battery, with particular focus on the division.

As we worked to redesign Army XXI we had to stop and think about what is different about the future. And the first work that we did was we wrote down in a concept paper – *Tradoc pamphlet 525-5* – our vision of what future battlefields might be like, and how we intended to fight on that future battlefield. Again it is that vision that we gained as we stood out on that mountaintop and tried to imagine what it looks like out there.

We are a concept based requirements system oriented army, so we began with the concepts. And then we further wrote that concept from a broad concept down to a division organisational and operational concept and further wrote down to the tactics, techniques and procedures we would use for an army force that did not yet exist, that was only created in our mind.

We are also writing *Field Manual 100-5* a version which will be the 1998 version which will direct our doctrine how we fight our wars.

But we found as we looked at this concept that there were a couple of things that emerged:

- how we visualize the battlefield;
- how we use information; and specifically
- how we fight that force.

#### **Army XXI – What will not be different...**

But as I talk about what will change, one thing I would like to come back to is, to discuss what will not be different.

We have learned as we trained our army coming out of the seventies, creating the Army of Excel-

lence in the mid 1980's, further refined our leader development, our unit training, refined our air-land battle doctrine, put the modern equipment that we have in our army today and actively recruited the all volunteer force seeking quality people as a very important part of that all volunteer force. That we had a very capable army because we kept all six of these things in balance.

So as we move toward Army XXI one of our objective is to ensure that we keep all of these in the proper balance.

As we move beyond Army XXI even further into the future our clear understanding is that we must balance that chain so that all six of these imperatives themselves stay in balance.

With as much focus on the quality of the individual soldiers and the leader development.

### **Army XXI – Visualizing the battlefield**

So back to the thing that we saw that was different.

First of all how we visualize the battlefield.

For so many years in my professional lifetime from 1963, when I first came in the army and was assigned in Berlin, until 1989 when the wall came down, my focus was on Fulda and the Fulda gap. And fighting a linear fight in depth against an enemy that we knew a lot about, studied very carefully.

And in today's environment though we are looking much more broadly at the battlefield in fact, we recognized that the future battlefield is probably not going to be linear at all, that there will be a series of small battles and engagements which may be shaping events that sets the stage for the ultimate military operation against an opponents centre of gravity. And that centre of gravity may be something that's traditional very recognizable, but as the republican guards main forces, worth maybe something in a humanitarian operation like getting the schools open. And the shaping events to getting the schools open are to get the debris out of the streets, and get the electricity restored, get the water running again and so there are shaping events that must occur before you can attack that enemy.

We also recognize because of information systems and our ability to connect various capabilities from army to navy to air force, from the division tactical commander all the way up to strategic level, intelligence and communication systems that the tactical commander is going to be connected to and involved in a battle stage that is much larger and more complex than the tactical commander that thought about fighting the army in the Fulda gap, a much more complex environment.

### **Army XXI – Using Information**

So how we visualize that battlestage is very important, and it brings us to the next point about what is different and that is how we will use information.

That will allow us to operate within this enlarged and more complex battlestage. I certainly see that we must link, and we are linking, strategic, operational and tactical sensors, to provide us information about enemy situation and friendly situation on that battlefield.

Linking information to shooters because targets are very complex, very difficult, very short in duration and we must find better and better ways to go straight from the sensor to the shooter, once the rules of engagement are established, to minimize time.

#### *Linked sensors-to-shooters*

In *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* for example, when we could locate a Scud missile launcher it would often take us an hour and a half or more to launch an effective attack against it.

And some recent field experimentation we have done, we have shorten this time down to as little as 11 minutes, and we must get better than that to be effective. So we are seeing some dramatic changes in our ability to link sensors-to-shooters. We must be able to dominate this expanded battlespace, one of the things also in a non-linear environment that we must do is reduce the logistic burden for our tactical units, now they are still going to shoot bullets, they are still going to burn fuel, we are still going to have to feed soldiers.

Though finding out exactly where we need the logistic support, what it is, where it must go, at the right place at the right time, becomes an important capability for the future, and we are looking at many techniques for anticipating by using predictive simulation models. What logistic support will be required at what point in time at what place on the battlefield.

#### *Real-time situational awareness*

Real-time situational awareness that we can provide the commanders is probably the most crucial thing that we can provide in the future, we are working very hard right now in our experimental force to do just that.

What do I mean by real-time situational awareness?

If you go to our national training centre were every one of our active heavy brigades (armoured and mechanized infantry brigades) trains, we have there a demanding opposing force – a very professional opposing force. We have a large manoeuvre area with instrumented facilities there, so we can track the exact locations of units that are engaging one another.

You will find that in a typical fight against the opposing force a well-trained battalion gets about half of its anti-armour systems, its tanks, its bradley's. About half of those get into any fight, any single engagement and that is because the enemy is always looking for a way to gain advantage of surprise, the terrain is very difficult, the situation is ambiguous, the commander of the blue force doesn't always know exactly where his units are. If we can just improve the situation so that that battalion commander can get 70 or 80 percent of its weapons in the fight. We have dramatically increased his combat capability. We believe that we can do that through improved situational awareness.

#### *Enroute Mission Rehearsal*

Being able when you are a power protection force to do mission rehearsal enroute is very important whether you are deploying by sea or by air, because the situation is being constantly updated, your knowledge about the enemies situation, through friendly forces on the ground.

So we are looking for ways to do that.

All in all we believe with all of these capabilities brought together that the tempo of operations will be greatly accelerated and that we can operate at this accelerated tempo, better than any opposing force that comes to us.

#### **Army XXI – Patterns of Activity**

So as we think about how we are going to fight, as we look at our recent operational experience since 1989, we see that there are patterns of activity that emerged.

We must protect the force, nothing remarkable or different about that. We have always had that requirement and we must protect the force.

But three of the things in these patterns of activity that are significantly different is that we now have an opportunity to gain information dominance, to know more about the enemy force and more about our own force than we ever have in the past.

And we also have the additional challenge to prevent the enemy force from knowing as much about us as we know about him.

We believe that with precision weapons and the kind of sensors at the strategic, operational and tactical level that we have, that we can now begin shaping the battlespace to set the conditions for decisive manoeuvre well before we engage our manoeuvre forces in direct combat with the enemy.

Our current national military strategy in the US calls for us to be prepared to fight two near simultaneous major regional contingents. So you can look at South-West-Asia as one of those

and perhaps North-Korea as another.

In order for us to do that we must prepare ourselves to engage in the first major regional contingency and once we are beginning to bring that situation under control some of the forces that are committed to the first theatre will be disengaged and move to the future operation for the second theatre. A very, very demanding requirement.

And it says to us, as we think about sustaining, we must do everything that we can to enable ourselves to quickly transition future operations.

#### **Gaining Information Dominance**

In the area of gaining information dominance, here are some of the concepts.

This is intelligence preparation of the battlefield, it must be continuous as we see a potential crisis area heating up in the world. We cannot wait until our tactical forces are deployed to that theatre. We have high resolution intelligence available to the commander, that must be available to him before he deploys his force, so that he can do efficient rehearsals in the continental US or wherever he may be with his force prior to deployment.

We must be able to disrupt enemy information operations, preventing the enemy from knowing a lot about us, and we must think in terms of our installations, our forts and so in the US as being critical command, control and intelligence platforms where we can receive information and then move that information forward to our deployed forces.

Our global command and control system is one of the important capabilities for smart-jamming, very selective jamming, as I talked about earlier, improved sensor-to-shooter links, all very important to this capability.

Some of the technologies are shown here, this (ABCS) stands for *Army Battle Command Systems*. *Joint Synthetic Airborne Radar System* (JSTARS) is on a Boeing aircraft and has the capability to look at broad areas and to report moving targets. *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles* (UAV) – are all things we are doing in terms of technical development right now.

Some of these systems are actually operational, we have used JSTARS even in its prototype form already in Bosnia, used it in Saoedi-Arabia.

#### **Shaping the Battlespace**

Terms of shaping the battlespace, I have talked about that a little bit already but the tactical commander wants to do several things.

He wants to reduce the enemies ability to respond to any initiative that he takes. Typically he will do that by seeking out and attacking, trying to disable the enemies artillery, the enemies

command and control and intelligence capability, he will try to disable or immobilize the enemies highly manoeuvrable reserve forces, he will suppress the enemies air-defence, so that we can take advantage of our attack aviation and air force air-capability. He will do all of these kinds of things before he commits his critical manoeuvre forces to the decisive fight.

Now this is an overall simplification: generally in the past with our heavy forces, we would use the heavy force to slam into the enemy and try to find the weakness in the enemy and then once we found the weakness we would push our reserve forces through to exploit that weakness. We believe today with the sensors and intelligence systems that we have that we can see where the enemy is and where the enemy is not. In any future, especially non-linear situations, we can set conditions with precision engagement and some precision manoeuvre that will allow us, when we commit our ground manoeuvre forces supported by all of our fires, to be very decisive. But it is a change in mind-setting how we approach preparing battlefields for the commitment of military forces.

#### **Decisive Operations**

For the decisive operations we want to attack the enemy from as many different locations, in as many of his locations as we can, in a near simultaneous way.

It will certainly involve manoeuvre forces, but manoeuvre forces now conducting manoeuvre with greater precision with much better knowledge and understanding of where the enemy is located, in what strength. And also a better knowledge of what our capabilities are. Information technology will allow us to know with much greater precision where our own forces are.

It will not surprise any experienced military officer in the audience what I'm about to say, but it may surprise some of you that are not/that have not been involved in land operations yourself.

Going back to our experience at the national training centre in the US, 48 percent of the radio communications in a typical operation are devoted to: Where are you? Is your radio working? Is my radio working? Can you talk to the 1st platoon? Where is the 1st platoon?

Situational awareness, it seems so practical, so expected that we would know with precision every moment where all of our units are, but in reality you do not.

If we can enable the commander with a self-reporting global positioning system, to know on his screen where all of his subordinate units are, than he can execute manoeuvres with enormously greater precision than he used to.

#### **Characteristics**

As we characterize Army XXI operations, we say they will be multi-dimensional, simultaneous, non-linear. They will be greatly distributed, i.e. multiple targets and multiple locations attacking with precision and we will be able to, and we must, integrate all of our supporting means, electronic means, precision weapons, manoeuvre, air strike, to achieve the massed effects in multiple locations.

#### **Army XXI – Enemy Insights**

So, that is all very interesting in terms of concept, but what we have already done is about a half a dozen major experiments taking prototype equipment, prototype tactical and operational concepts, different approaches to training with our units and we have actually conducted operations in a number of different settings. At the battalion task force and some at higher levels, some at brigade level.

We are moving now to the point in March, where we will do a major exercise at our national training centre, with an actual heavy brigade from the 4th division at Ft Hood, Texas.

We have supplied this brigade with all the best prototype information technology equipment we can give them. They have gone through platoon level training they are, at the moment that I speak, they are doing company level training, they will then go to battalion and then brigade level training and next match they will go into the manoeuvre box at the National Training Centre, where they will compete with the opposing force, a world class opposing force. And we will observe all that they do with careful instrumentation and many observers, so that we can demonstrate whether or not these ideas that we have developed are really workable.

I will share with you just a view insights from some of our experimentation to this point.

A few months ago we put dismounted infantry together. A light infantry brigade, equipped with some situational awareness digital information systems and night-vision equipment, vastly improved over what our normal units have now. We point them at our *Joint Readiness Training Centre* where we were engaged in dismounted operation. And this again may sound like a very simple situation, but if you have been there, you understand the importance.

#### **Ambush Vignette**

The battalion commander of one of the battalion task forces gave two platoons a mission: "Move out in the night, in the dark, and place an ambush here and one here, and prepare to receive enemy patrols that are coming along and if you encounter enemy patrols kill them".

The first platoon goes out and gets in exactly the correct position. The second platoon goes out and gets in exactly the wrong position. The battalion commander, because he had electronic awareness of where precisely those platoons were, knew immediately that the second platoon was about two kilometres away from the correct location. He was able then through the company commander to give that platoon instruction to move. The platoon leader never had to make a report. His global positioning system was reporting for him. And it appeared on a little screen that the battalion commander had in his Command Post. So the error was corrected before the mission opportunity was lost to kill the enemy patrol or before we shot friendly artillery fire at that location, before we shot our own soldiers which would have been a tactical disaster. A very simple minor situation, but it is a very powerful one.

#### *Night Attack Vignette*

In the same operation, we had a mission that we routinely give units, and that is to attack a fortified position at night, a live firing exercise.

This fortified position is a mission given to a platoon. The fortified position has six bunkers in it, has automated targets that can return fire with 'laser fire-back' on the force that is attacking. So they can be vulnerable, their laser sensors will go off and they now they are a casualty of the enemy who shoots at them.

Normally, it takes an infantry platoon a minimum of 1 1/2 hours to attack this position and to defeat it. And in a typical attack the infantry platoon has about 30 percent casualties.

We gave this platoon greatly improved situational awareness, the ability in the platoon to talk to all the members of the platoon, we gave them 'own the night' equipment, laserpointers for the squad leaders to be able to designate targets, night-vision goggles for the soldiers to use, laserpointers on the individual weapon, so the soldier could first put a laser dot on the target before he fired his weapon, so he could see exactly where it was going to hit. And in terms of 'own the night' equipment the night vision goggles that I mentioned.

We also digitally connected the forward observer with this platoon through the mortar platoon which was firing support for them. The result in the short term was that the platoon was successful in its mission in 30 minutes, and it had 0 casualties.

It was able to bring precision adjusted fire on to the bunkers themselves in 1 1/2 minute.

Normally, it takes eight minutes for that kind of fire to be delivered and the fire was much more precise than usual. We were able to hit directly and destroy two of the six bunkers just with

mortar fire alone. We also find that the soldiers were able to shoot at individual targets at night with the same degree of accuracy they had in daytime, with their laserpointers and night vision.

What a dramatic increase in combat capability, just with information systems technology.

Well those were two examples at a very low tactical level, we have others at higher level that I can talk about in the question time.

#### **The Way Ahead**

But I would like to say in terms of where do we go from here?

We have created the experimental force, we are equipping some field units with new equipment that fits the Army XXI philosophy.

In California in March of 1997, we will conduct a large command post exercise at our command and staff college looking at logistic support, other division level and corps level command and control concepts.

We will do a simulation exercise at Ft Hood, Texas with the entire 4th division, which will lead into the 'Division Advanced Corps Fighting Experiment', as that is called, at Ft Hood Texas in November 1997.

This experiment will be done entirely in simulation, not involved a field training exercise.

After the completion of this exercise in November of 1997, in February of 1998 we will come forward to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army with recommendations on the final design for the division 21, and we will begin fielding that division in the year 2000.

It will take us from the year 2000 till about 2010 to finish fielding all six of our heavy divisions in this new design, with that equipment, it's a question of affordability.

Something that all of our armies face.

During that period of ten to twelve years we will have a high mix, in terms of highly modernized forces and then a low mix in terms of the kinds of forces we have today.

We believe that, as we think about working with our coalition partners, we will have the high/low mix in our own forces, that will still enable us to work effectively with our coalition partners during times of tension.

We also believe that the information technology as we move into the future, will become more mature, more capable and cheaper; that we can bring information technology into our forces more cheaply in the year 2005 than we did in the year 2000, hopefully even more cheaply in the year 2010.

### **Moving Beyond Army XXI**

We are moving as I have said to Army XXI, at the same time we are looking beyond that to the year 2025 trying to figure out: what beyond Army XXI?

Army XXI will essentially create a little bit smaller division, organized around the same kinds of units that we have in today's US Army. Call it the Army of Excellence.

But enabled by information systems, those information systems then will provide the basis for us to move even further into the future with the addition of other technologies beyond those of information systems alone.

Moving to the future in terms of gun propulsions, vehicular propulsion systems, lighter weight tanks, smaller units, more lethal units.

Then of course the process will continue, to move even beyond that.

At the moment we are thinking about this Army XXI which will be ours in the year 2000/2010, then what happens after that?

We see that in our view, our strategic overview, we do not see a major competitor in the world scene before 2010/2015, that's an estimate, and it can change daily as we know.

But as we look to the future, we believe we enter a window of risk beyond 2010/2015, we just cannot see clearly. We believe that we should be preparing for leap-ahead technology and even greater capabilities in future times.

We believe that in that future out there, the information revolution will continue. There will be better and better information technology available to us. We must make significant improvements in logistic support for strategic deployability purposes for our forces. That there will be some mobility revolution, a 50 knots ship (you navy guys hold your hearts).

Technically it's possible, not really affordable just yet, but technically it's possible.

### **The Road to the Future**

For the Army After Next, beyond Army XXI, here are some of the characteristics, these are just some very early thoughts.

So the road to the future, the 'Army of Excellence' we have used in the past especially in *Desert Shield/Storm*, enhanced by information techno-

logy brings us to Army XXI and then those other capabilities that I just mentioned carries us on to the 'Army After Next'.

We move down this road to the future.

And at each point along this path we are working very hard to ensure the balance for those six imperatives, we must have:

- quality soldiers;
- properly, professionally educated officers and NCO's;
- a doctrine which is sensible, which will frame for us how we intend to fight;
- a training programme which teaches our units, our soldiers and our leaders how to employ the technologies and the concepts for how we will fight;
- the right mix of forces, active and reserve components, the right mix of branches within our army and the right mix with our joint services and our coalition partners;
- adequately modern equipment, of course this is the expensive part.

"THE ARMY IS LIKE A FUNNEL, AT THE TOP YOU POUR DOCTRINE, RESOURCES, CONCEPTS, EQUIPMENT, AND FACILITIES. AND OUT AT THE BOTTOM COMES ONE LONE SOLDIER WALKING POINT."

General Harold K. Johnson  
Chief of Staff, Army, 1964-1968

In the final analysis, as one of our former Chiefs of Staff said, back in the heart of the Cold War: "The army is like a funnel, pour into it doctrine, resources, facilities, equipment, and out the bottom comes one great young soldier, there to do the mission that his nation has given him".

And we must never forget the importance of this human being right here, and the importance of the team that he is a part of.

Having well-motivated, well-lead quality individuals is vital to us as we move to 21st century and beyond.

Thank you for your kind attention, I think we take a short brake and then have questions and answers. ■

# Algemene Ledenvergadering

Het bestuur van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap heeft het voornemen om haar jaarlijkse Algemene Ledenvergadering (ALV) te houden op 12 mei 1997, Defensie Voorlichtingscentrum, Ronde Zaal, Korte Houtstraat 21, 's-Gravenhage.

De ALV vangt aan om 22.00 uur; voorafgaand aan deze vergadering zal een bijeenkomst worden gehouden over de Frans-Europese veiligheidspolitiek, ontwikkelingen en achtergronden. De lezing vangt aan om 20.00 uur. Onder voorbehoud spreekt professor Dominique Moisi.

## Agenda ALV

1. Opening door de voorzitter.
2. Jaarverslag van de secretaris, met inbegrip van public relations.
3. Jaarverslag van de penningmeester.
4. Verslag van de kascontrolecommissie.
5. Verkiezing kascontrolecommissie 1997.
6. Mutaties bestuursleden.
7. Voordracht voor erelidmaatschap.
8. Aanstelling ledenadministratrice.
8. Rondvraag.
9. Sluiting door de voorzitter.

## Mutaties bestuursleden

Sedert de ALV van 11 juni 1996 is het bestuur als volgt samengesteld:

voorzitter: generaal-majoor mr. drs. C. Homan,  
vice-voorzitter: kolonel H.M. van Lent,  
secretaris: luitenant-kolonel J. Hardenbol,  
penningmeester: kolonel M.P. Dekker,  
public relations: kapitein drs. M. de Haas.

hoofdredacteur van de Militaire Spectator en Mars in Cathedra: generaal-majoor b.d. T. de Kruijf.

### leden:

luitenant-generaal b.d. prof. G.C. Berkhof,  
kolonel J.A. van Diepenbrugge,  
drs. M. R. Jochems,  
commandeur R.A.A. Klaver,  
kolonel R. Neervoort,  
drs. F.J.J. Princen,  
kapitein-ter-zee W.H.C. van Straten.

Per 21 mei zijn aftredend en niet herkiesbaar, de bestuursleden G.C. Berkhof (lid), J.A. van Diepenbrugge (lid), J. Hardenbol (secretaris), R.A.A. Klaver (lid), W.H.C. van Straten (lid) en R. Neervoort (lid). Aftredend en herkiesbaar zijn de bestuursleden M.P. Dekker (penningmeester) en F.J.J. Princen (lid).

Het bestuur draagt voor de functie van secretaris voor: majoor I.M. de Jong, thans werkzaam bij de Landmachtstaf, Koninklijke Landmacht afdeling Planning. Tevens worden voorgedragen als lid van het bestuur commodore D.L. Berlijn, Souschef Operatiën van de Luchtmachtstaf en kapitein-luitenant-ter-zee F.T.S. van der Laan, Marinestaf afdeling Plannen.

Tevens treedt af de hoofdredacteur van de Militaire Spectator en Mars in Cathedra T. de Kruijf. Het bestuur draagt brigade-generaal professor J.M.J. Bosch voor als bestuurslid, tevens hoofdredacteur Militaire Spectator en Mars in Cathedra. Professor Bosch is als hoogleraar verbonden aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie.

## Voordracht erelidmaatschap

Het bestuur van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap verzoekt de Algemene Ledenvergadering tot erelid te benoemen, conform de statuten (artikel 4 lid 3), de heer J.J.M. Nijman. Aan dit erelidmaatschap ligt de volgende considerans ten grondslag:

*Wegens het op voortreffelijke wijze vervullen van de functie van ledenadministrateur van de vereniging gedurende twintig jaar. De heer Nijman heeft zijn functie op 1 mei 1977 aanvaard. Door zijn betrokkenheid, kennis van zaken en inzet heeft hij een buitengewoon waardevolle bijdrage geleverd aan het functioneren van de vereniging.*

## Jaarverslag van de secretaris

In 1996 heeft het bestuur bijzondere aandacht besteed aan de omvang van het ledenbestand. Zo is mede door de activiteiten in de public relations-sfeer sedert enige tijd weer een toename van het aantal leden waar te nemen. Ook is er een stijging van het aantal belangstellenden dat de thema-avonden bezoekt. De KVBK heeft in 1996 behalve de uitgite van de Militaire Spectator en de Mars in Cathedra, negen bijeenkomsten georganiseerd, waarbij naast een brede variatie aan onderwerpen en sprekers, bewust is gekozen voor diverse locaties, samenwerking met andere verenigingen en de optie meerdere inleiders te laten spreken over hetzelfde onderwerp. Van de negen themabijeenkomsten werden er overigens drie gehouden in de Engelse taal.

Het jaar 1996 startte met een voordracht op 30 januari door mr. drs. Frits Bolkestein, fractievoorzitter van de VVD in de Tweede Kamer. Het auditorium van het Instituut Defensie Leergangen zat die avond vol met 260 toehoorders. De heer Bolkestein sprak over: 'De rol van de Ne-

derlandse Krijgsmacht in de gewijzigde veiligheidssituatie'.

Op 5 maart organiseerde het bestuur een bijeenkomst in de Ronde Zaal van het Defensie Voorlichtingscentrum te 's-Gravenhage, over het thema: 'Hoe koop je een helikopter?' Sprekers waren mr. R.H. van der Meer, van de Stichting Nederlandse Industriële Inschakeling Defensieopdrachten (NIID), en commodore D. Starink van de Koninklijke Luchtmacht.

Op 7 mei werd inhoud gegeven aan de wens van het bestuur om ook eens een bijeenkomst te houden voor een andere doelgroep van de vereniging: studenten. Luitenant-kolonel Cees Ros, voormalig adjunct-defensie attaché te Moskou, hield een inleiding voor onze leden en het Leids Dispuut voor Ruslandkundigen en Slavisten *Novaja Gvardija*. Dit door het bestuurslid Marcel de Haas gelanceerde initiatief bleek een groot succes te zijn. Niet alleen was de avond inhoudelijk zeer de moeite waard, tevens heeft deze nieuwe doelgroep zowel een kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve versterking van het ledenbestand opgeleverd.

Ook in 1996 stond samenwerking met een bevriende en gelieerde vereniging op de agenda. Zo werd op 4 juni op het Instituut Defensie Leer- gangen in samenwerking met het Instituut Clingendael een minisymposium georganiseerd rond het thema 'Nederland op vredesexpeditie'. Juridische aspecten, politiek rendement en militaire implicaties werden aan de orde gesteld door respectievelijk prof. dr. C. Flinterman (hoogleraar universiteit Limburg), drs. P. Scheffer (publicist) en brigade-generaal b.d. J.C. de Vogel (voormalig attaché te Belgrado). Basis voor deze bijeenkomst vormde een rapport van Clingendael dat is uitgebracht onder dezelfde titel. Vanuit een panel werden reacties gegeven. Het panel bestond uit schrijvers van diverse hoofdstukken van de publicatie: *Nederland op vredesexpeditie*, te weten: drs. D.A. Leurdijk, dr. S. Rozemond, prof. dr. A. van Staden, prof. dr. J.G. Siccama en KLTZ G.C. de Nooy.

Dezelfde maand en wel op 11 juni werd door ir. J.B.J. Orbons (beleidsmedewerker Defensiestaf afdeling Conceptuele Zaken) en dr. D.W. Hoffmans (Hoofd Divisie Munitietechnologie en Explosie- veiligheid, P.M.L., TNO) een antwoord gegeven op de vraag: 'Niet-letale wapens. De oplossing voor vredesoperaties?' Deze themavond werd wederom gehouden in de Ronde Zaal van het Defensievoorlichtingscentrum.

'The Armed Forces the Next Generation' was de titel van de lezing die luitenant-generaal (US) John Miller gaf op 24 september in de Ronde

Zaal. Hij is als plaatsvervangend commandant van het Amerikaanse *Training and Doctrine Command* onder meer belast met het project *Army XXI*.

8 Oktober 1996 mocht de vereniging zich verheugen op de komst van luitenant-generaal R. Reitsma, die een inleiding over: 'De grenzen van multinationaliteit'. Hierbij gaf hij niet alleen inzicht in zijn ervaringen binnen het *1(GE/NL) Corps*, maar schetste hij de laatste ontwikkelingen op het gebied van internationale samenwerking en het nut van multinationale verbanden in een breed kader.

Veel belangstelling was er voor de komst van de wereldberoemde publicist en historicus prof. dr. Martin van Creveld. Binnen één dag na de aankondiging was de Ronde Zaal reeds volgeboekt waardoor wij helaas zeer veel leden moesten teleurstellen. Zijn voordracht 'Fighting terrorism. The battle of the future', bracht de gemoederen danig in beroering. Deze avond werd georganiseerd in samenwerking met de Atlantische Commissie en kwam tot stand dankzij de bemiddeling van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis van de Koninklijke Landmacht.

Het bestuur heeft ook in 1996 inhoud gegeven aan haar beleidsvoornemen om in de omgeving van Breda jaarlijks een bijeenkomst te organiseren. De Seeligkazerne was dan ook de locatie waar op 19 november de brigade-generaal H.F. Koopmans en luitenant-kolonel C.H.M. Nouwens het publiek lieten delen in hun ervaringen in het voormalig Joegoslavië, met hun voordracht over: 'Joint Endeavour: the experience'.

Op 26 januari 1996 heeft de generaal-majoor mr. drs. C. Homan in zijn functie van voorzitter van de KVBK, de Krijgswetenschapsprijs uitge-reikt aan de luitenant-ter-zee 2e klasse J.W. Verkiel (KIM) voor zijn afstudeerverslag *Koers zetten in woelig water*. Hij kreeg uit handen van de voorzitter een 14 karaats gouden vulpen en een enveloppe met inhoud voor de uitzonderlijk goede kwaliteit van zijn scriptie.

De KMA was dit jaar door een gewijzigde opzet en start van haar opleidingen niet in de gelegenheid om een kandidaat voor te dragen voor de Krijgswetenschapsprijs 1996.

Op 11 juni 1996 werd de Algemene Ledenvergadering gehouden. De ALV ging akkoord met de voorgestelde bestuurswijzigingen en heeft onder dankzegging aan kolonel b.d. mr. E.L. Gonsalves en drs. C.F. van Waaij de bevindingen van de kascontrolecommissie gearresteerd. Voor 1996 heeft mr. E.L. Gonsalves zich wederom bereid verklaard zitting te nemen in de kascontrolecommissie. →

Als tweede lid is gekozen majoor T.J. Hovenier. Tijdens de rondvraag bedankte het erelid luitenant-kolonel b.d. W.F. Anthonijsz het bestuur voor haar inspanning en bovendien wees hij op de toegenomen kwaliteit van en de belangstelling voor de lezingen. Ten slotte deed hij de suggestie het bestuur te laten bezien in hoeverre

samenwerking kan worden gezocht met andere militaire verenigingen om zo het aantal leden uit te breiden. De gedachten gingen daarbij met name uit naar georganiseerde reserve- en oud-officieren. Het bestuur zal hierover in 1997 rapporteren. ■

## Jaarverslag bestuurslid Public Relations

In het vorige jaarverslag werd aangekondigd dat niet alleen militairen van belang zijn als doelgroep, maar ook degenen die zich bezighouden met veiligheidsbeleid en andere interessegebieden van de vereniging. Het betreft hier bijvoorbeeld beleidsmedewerkers van wetenschappelijke instituten en departementen, maar ook studenten. Deze koers van de KVBK heeft inmiddels al succes opgeleverd. In mei jl. werd een zeer geslaagde en vooral door studenten goed bezochte bijeenkomst gehouden op de Letterenfaculteit van de Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, met als onderwerp 'Rusland en het leger '90-'95'. Het bestuur hoopt in het nieuwe verenigingsjaar dit soort activiteiten op universiteiten, en mogelijk ook op andere instituten, verder uit te breiden.

De 'oude' doelgroep wordt echter niet vergeten. De functionele aanwezigheid van het bestuurslid

pr en de hoofdredacteur van de Militaire Spectator op de KMA heeft geresulteerd in een behoorlijke opgang ten aanzien van de werving onder cadetten en vaste staf op dit instituut. Inmiddels zijn enige tientallen cadetten en leden van de vaste staf lid geworden van de KVBK. Verder is het bestuur van plan om naast werving ook andere activiteiten te ontwikkelen op de KMA, zoals het organiseren van lezingen of symposia. Gezien de status van de KMA, waar nu alle officiersopleidingen van land- en luchtmacht zijn geconcentreerd, is hier zeker aanleiding toe. Daarnaast sluit ook de positie van de KMA als militair-wetenschappelijk instituut goed aan op de doelstellingen en werkterreinen van de KVBK.

Het bestuur hoopt de werving onder de genoemde doelgroepen dit jaar verder te ontwikkelen, om daarmee een naar leeftijdsopbouw en een naar aantal toenemend ledenbestand te bewerkstelligen. Daarbij is het verheugend te mogen constateren dat, terwijl de personeelssterkte van de krijgsmacht daalt, de omvang van ons ledenbestand toch een stijging vertoont. ■

## Jaarverslag penningmeester 1996

### Resultaten 1996

1. Algemeen. Het jaar 1996 is financieel gunstiger verlopen voor de vereniging dan aan van-keljk was verwacht. Het normale verenigingswerk is afgesloten met een positief resultaat van f 5.634,80, terwijl een negatief resultaat was verwacht (van f 2.100,00). Het verschil van f 7.743,80 kan worden verklaard uit het feit dat de opbrengsten circa 13,4 procent hoger waren dan voorzien, de uitgaven daarentegen circa 7,8 procent lager. Hieronder zal meer en detail worden verklaard waaruit de verschillen bestaan.

2. In 1996 is het ledental van de vereniging licht gegroeid, als gevolg van de inspanningen met name het bestuurslid pr. Dit is opmerkelijk, gelet op de kleiner wordende krijgsmacht en dus het afnemend aantal officieren – een van

oudsher belangrijke doelgroep voor de vereniging. Met name het aantal officieren van de Koninklijke Landmacht neemt af. De financiële gevolgen van de geringe ledengroei zullen echter vooral tot uitdrukking komen in een gelijkblijvende opbrengst uit contributie. Zonder inspanningen voor de ledenwerving zou de opbrengst ongetwijfeld dalen.

3. Baten. In totaal is over 1996 een bedrag van f 38.245,— aan contributie (incasso opdrachten, acceptgiro's en rekeningen) verschuldigd door leden en abonnees. Daarvan staat nog een bedrag van f 1.445,— open. Bovendien is een bedrag van f 2.060,— afgeschreven ten laste van de voorziening die daarvoor was genomen. De contributie-ontvangsten over het jaar 1996 bedragen derhalve f 34.740,—. Door leden te benaderen die nog een contributie-achterstand hadden over 1995 en vorige jaren, is het gelukt een deel van het openstaande bedrag (f 490,—) alsnog te ontvangen, waardoor de totale contributie-ontvangsten in het jaar 1996 een bedrag belopen van f 35.230,—. Hoewel dit iets hoger is dan begroot, is het opnieuw een daling ten

opzichte van het jaar 1995. De nog openstaande bedragen voor de jaren 1995 en 1994 zijn ten laste van de voorzieningen gebracht.

4. Door verschillende leden is een gift aan de vereniging gedaan. In totaal is een bedrag van f 528,— op deze wijze ontvangen.

5. Lasten. De bestuurskosten (het totaal van de posten Secretariaat, Public Relations Algemeen, Betalingsverkeer en Overig bestuur) is f 8.279,31, hetgeen nagenoeg volgens de begroting is. De overschrijding op de post 'Betalingsverkeer' is veroorzaakt door het aanschaffen van nieuwe acceptgirokaarten. Zij wordt gecompenseerd door de meevallende kosten van het drukken van folders. Het doet het bestuur genoegen dat inmiddels ongeveer de helft van het aantal betalende leden een machtiging tot automatische incasso heeft gegeven, waardoor de kosten konden worden beperkt. De overige deelposten vertonen nauwelijks afwijkingen van de begroting.

6. De post 'Lezingen' overschrijdt de begroting met circa f 2.260,—. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door het iets grotere aantal lezingen dan waarmee rekening was gehouden, en de zeer grote opkomst. Daardoor lopen de kosten voor koffie en drankjes uiteraard ook hoger op. Door het vragen van een vrijwillige bijdrage voor het bijwonen van lezingen (aan niet-leden) is een bedrag van f 725,— ontvangen. Dit is verdisconteerd in het bedrag dat voor lezingen als 'last' staat vermeld.

7. De post 'Mars in Cathedra' is aanzienlijk onder de begroting gebleven. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door het terughoudende publicatiebeleid van het bestuur en de redactie. Het jaar 1997 is het laatste jaar dat de Mars in Cathedra in de huidige vorm wordt uitgegeven.

8. Verdere meevallers werden geboekt op de posten 'Prijzen' (onderschrijding van f 1.087,30) en 'Diversen' (onderschrijding van f 1.000,—).

9. Bijzondere baten. Het lustrum dat in 1995 is gehouden, is in 1996 financieel geheel afgesloten met een meevaller. De op de balans opgenomen voorziening ten behoeve van het gedenkboek, was niet in haar geheel noodzakelijk; het resterende bedrag van f 2.698,25 komt ten gunste van het resultaat. De nog openstaande post van een sponsor kon (gelukkig) geïnd worden.

10. De resterende bedragen in de voorzieningen voor oninbare contributie vallen vrij ten gunste van de verlies- en winstrekening.

11. Balans per 31 december 1996. Het verenigingsjaar wordt afgesloten met positief resultaat van f 8.333,05. Door het vrijvallen van de resterende voorzieningen voor oninbare contributie 1994 en 1995 en het lustrumboek, komt het totaal op f 8.498,05.

Het bestuur stelt voor om dit bedrag als volgt te besteden:

- opnieuw een reservering van f 3.000,— te nemen voor niet-betalende leden,
- het restant toe te voegen aan het kapitaal, dat daardoor groeit tot een bedrag van f 111.494,97.

## Begroting 1997

12. Baten. Gelet op de resultaten van de vorige jaren wordt ook voor dit jaar een bedrag van f 35.000,— begroot voor de contributie-opbrengsten. Dit is waarschijnlijk een conservatieve schatting. Hoewel ook voor 1997 inspanningen worden verricht voor het verkrijgen van nieuwe leden, zal deze inspanning waarschijnlijk net voldoende zijn om het aantal leden gelijk te houden, terwijl de krijgsmacht (met name de KL) in omvang afneemt.

13. De rente-opbrengsten zijn de laatste jaren sterk gedaald door de lage rentestand. Bovendien behoeft het kapitaal reeds enige jaren niet te worden aangesproken. Het bestuur heeft daarom besloten tot een andere vorm van beleggen van het kapitaal van de vereniging. Een belangrijk deel hiervan zal worden belegd in langlopende obligaties, die per jaar circa 2 procent meer zullen opbrengen dan spaarrekeningen. In het eerste jaar zullen de aankoopkosten echter een enigszins drukkend effect hebben, zodat voor 1997 rekening wordt gehouden met een gelijk beleggingsresultaat als in 1996. Overigens blijft het mogelijk het kapitaal onmiddellijk te gelde te maken door verkoop van de obligaties op de beurs.

14. Lasten. Het becirag voor lezingen is dit jaar enigszins verhoogd, gelet op de resultaten van vorig jaar. Het betreft hier immers *core-business* van de vereniging, waarvoor voldoende middelen ter beschikking moeten blijven.

15. Het bestuur heeft besloten om in het vervolg een jaarboek uit te geven, in plaats van de periodieke bijlage bij de Militaire Spectator (Mars in Cathedra). Daarvoor zijn offertes gevraagd, die uitwijzen dat een kwalitatief goed jaarboek voor circa f 15.000,— kan worden uitgegeven.

16. Ook in 1997 zal een verhoogde inspanning worden geleverd om nieuwe leden te werven. Het bestuur denkt daarbij aan het mailen van een aantal doelgroepen. Om deze reden is een bedrag van f 2.500,— toegevoegd aan het normale budget voor public relations, dat daardoor komt op een totaal bedrag van f 3.500,—.

17. Het is voorzien dat het jaar 1997 zal worden afgesloten met een negatief resultaat van f 2.150,—. Omdat echter reeds een voorziening van f 3.000,— is genomen voor niet betalende leden, kan dit negatieve resultaat daarop worden afgeboekt. →

## Balans per 31 december 1996

### Activa

<b>Liquide middelen</b>	
Girorekening 1	1.294,01
Bank	526,55
Girorekening 2	124,51
<b>Beleggingen</b>	
Leeuwrekening	458,39
Kapitaalrekening	103.000,00
C&E Bank	27.134,69
<b>Debiteuren</b>	
Subsidie leerstoel	1.536,52
Diverse debiteuren	763,00
Contributie 1996	1.445,00
Voorschotten	1.464,63
<b>Inventaris</b>	
Boekwerken	470,82
Apparatuur	13.478,50
Software	538,35

152.234,97

### Passiva

<b>Vreemd vermogen</b>	
Vooruitbet contr 97	26.800,00
<b>Eigen vermogen</b>	
Kapitaal	105.996,92
Resultaat 1996	8.498,05
<b>Voorzieningen</b>	
Oninbare contr 96	940,00
Oninbare contr 97	0,00
<b>Reserveringen</b>	
Lustrum 2000	10.000,00

152.234,97

## Resultatenrekening 1996

Baten				Lasten			
	Werkelijk	Begroot	Verschil		Werkelijk	Begroot	Verschil
Contributie	38.245,00	38.000,00	+ 245,00	Ledenadm.	3.600,00	3.600,00	0,00
Rente	6.238,04	6.000,00	+ 238,04	Secretariaat	491,70	500,00	- 8,30
Leerstoel	22.036,52	20.500,00	+ 1.536,52	Publ Rel (alg)	4.035,47	5.000,00	- 964,53
Diversen	528,00	0,00	+ 528,00	Betalingsverkeer	1.756,59	750,00	+ 1.006,59
				Overig bestuur	1.995,55	2.000,00	- 4,45
				Afschrijving	3.911,94	4.000,00	- 88,06
				Lezingen	14.760,37	12.500,00	+ 2.260,37
Vrijval voorz				MiC	8.141,87	15.000,00	- 6.858,13
Contr 94/95	165,00	0,00	+ 165,00	Leerstoel	22.036,52	20.500,00	+ 1.536,52
				Prijzen	662,70	1.750,00	- 1.087,30
Lustrum 95	2.698,25	0,00	+ 2.698,25	Diversen	0,00	1.000,00	- 1.000,00
				Lustrum 95	20,05	0,00	+ 20,05
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>69.910,81</b>	<b>64.500,00</b>	<b>+ 5.410,81</b>	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>61.412,76</b>	<b>66.600,00</b>	<b>- 5.187,24</b>
<b>Resultaat</b>	<b>8.498,05</b>	<b>- 2.100,00</b>	<b>+ 10.698,05</b>				

*Bij de berekening van de baten is reeds rekening gehouden met het kunnen afboeken van max f 3.000 ten laste van een getroffen voorziening*

## Begroting 1997

Baten		Lasten	
	Begroot		Begroot
Contributie	35.000,00	Ledenadm.	1.650,00
Beleggingsresultaat	6.000,00	Secretariaat	500,00
Leerstoel	22.500,00	Publ Rel (alg)	3.500,00
Diversen	0,00	Betalingsverkeer	750,00
		Overige bestuur	2.000,00
		Afschrijving	4.000,00
		Lezingen	13.000,00
		Jaarboek	15.000,00
		Leerstoel	22.500,00
		Prijzen	1.750,00
		Diversen	1.000,00
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>63.500,00</b>	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>65.650,00</b>
<b>Resultaat</b>			<b>- 2.150,00</b>