

**KONINKLIJKE
VERENIGING
TER BEOEFENING
VAN DE
KRIJGSWETENSCHAP**

OPGERICHT 6 MEI 1865

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15 OKT

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IN DIT NUMMER

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Haag, 18 mei 1987 2520

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MEDEDELINGEN VAN HET BESTUUR

Seminar „De zuidflank van de NAVO”

Van de op 20 maart 1987 in Den Haag georganiseerde themadag over bovengenoemd onderwerp waren door de inleiders geen schriftelijke teksten ter publikatie beschikbaar gesteld.

Na een door het Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen „Clingendael” op 13, 14 en 15

mei in het Oosterbeekse conferentietoord „De Pietersberg” georganiseerde, nagenoeg identieke, bijeenkomst zijn echter drie van de in beide bijeenkomsten gehouden inleidingen alsnog op schrift ter beschikking gekomen, zodat deze in Mars in Cathedra kunnen worden gepubliceerd.

Bijeenkomst te Den Haag maandag 18 mei 1987

De *wnd Voorzitter*, bgen G. J. Folner, opent de vergadering en heet de aanwezigen welkom. In het bijzonder begroet hij de heer Praaning, directeur van de Atlantische Commissie, die aanwezig is om de Militaire Spectator legpenning in ontvangst te nemen. In een korte toespraak schildert de voorzitter de verdiensten van de heer Praaning op publicitair gebied, in het bijzonder de voortreffelijke wijze waarop hij zich heeft ingezet voor de verdieping van de kennis op het gebied van vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken bij brede lagen van onze bevolking. (Zie ook *MiC* (1987)(73)2502/3.)

Na een kort dankwoord van de heer Praaning introduceert de voorzitter *Oberst i. G. H.-J. Zeilinger*. Het thema van diens voordracht staat momenteel zeer in de aandacht, echter eerder wegens de eraan verbonden politieke aspecten dan om

militaire redenen. Voor de Vereniging zijn echter de laatstgenoemde aspecten van bijzonder belang. Kolonel Zeilinger is, zoals duidelijk blijkt uit zijn loopbaan, bijzonder gekwalificeerd om hierover uitspraken te doen.

Op de voordracht (zie blz. 2542 e.v.) volgt een geanimeerde discussie. In zijn slotwoord memoreert de voorzitter dat hij vóór de lezing zei dat — ondanks het feit dat de militaire helikopter thans vooral om politieke redenen in de belangstelling staat — de vraag naar het nut, misschien zelfs naar het bestaansrecht, van de militaire helikopter in zijn vele verschijningsvormen, eerst moet worden beantwoord. Kol Zeilinger is op uitnemende wijze erin geslaagd de gehele scala van mogelijkheden van de helikopter op de toehoorders over te brengen. Het komt de voorzitter echter voor dat vooral de klei-

nere landen uit die veelheid van mogelijkheden een verantwoorde keuze moeten maken, of moeten zoeken naar helikopters die meer taken kunnen uitvoeren. Los van de militair-technische aspecten zal aandacht moeten worden besteed aan het personeelsprobleem dat hedenavond ongenoemd is gebleven. De grote verdienste van kol Zeilinger is dat hij ons in zijn voordracht criteria heeft aangereikt op grond waarvan wij ons een bescheiden oordeel kunnen vormen.

Na het uitspreken van dank aan Oberst Zeilinger schorst de voorzitter de vergadering teneinde de (te vele) aanwezige niet-leden in staat te stellen de zaal te verlaten. Zijn oproep aan hen, alsnog ter plaatse lid te worden en de algemene jaarvergadering bij te wonen vindt helaas geen gehoor. (Het verslag van de Algemene ledenvergadering is gepubliceerd in *MiC* (1987)(73) 2502.)

MILITAIRE SPECTATOR

Maandelijks ontvangen de leden de Militaire Spectator. Ten einde de toezending aan de leden die thans nog actief dienend officier van Land- of Luchtmacht zijn, ook na hun dienstverlating zeker te stellen, wordt belanghebbenden verzocht de ledenadministratie van de Vereniging (Karel Doormanlaan 274, 2283 BB Rijswijk) in voorkomend geval ter zake in te lichten.

The strategic importance of NATO's Southern flank

M. F. Reynolds

Major-General retd.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am very honoured to have been asked here today to discuss the strategic importance of the Southern flank of NATO or, as I prefer to call it, NATO's Southern region, for it is after all an integral part of Europe. Now if we are to talk about strategic importance I suppose we should first of all be clear as to what we mean by strategy. There are many definitions — one generally accepted version is 'the art of employing military forces to achieve ends set by political policy'. However, this emphasizes the military aspect very strongly and although a retired soldier, I prefer, for reasons which I hope will become obvious, a more general definition: the aim of strategy is to fulfill objectives set by political policy, making the best use of all resources.

Well, what are the various strategies operating in and around the Southern region of NATO? NATO's strategy can be defined as to protect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member nation and to this end it sets out to deter war. Should war break out it is designed to protect those territories and restore the status quo. Simply put, I believe Soviet strategy can be said to be aimed at protecting the territory of the USSR and at the spread of communism, leading to world domi-

nation. And then of course, just to the East of the Southern region a third strategy seems to be developing, lead by Iran, and aimed at the spread of Arab fundamentalism and a resurgence of Islam. Next, I think we should be clear as to the geographic limits of the region, which is, one must remember, at the heart of three continents. The basis of the region is the Mediterranean. It includes the Aegean, Adriatic and Black seas. It comprises Portugal, Gibraltar, Italy, Greece and Turkey. France and Spain, although not within the military structure of NATO, are part of its political structure and take of course, an intense interest in the region and you will note that Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria all about on to the borders of the region, not to mention the Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and all the North-African coastal countries. This then is the area I shall talk about, an area little known or cared about by most North-American or Northern European people; considered mainly as a place for holidays, a place with sun-tanned skins, good wine and unstable governments. Certainly for many years that is how I thought of it and yet, being British and knowing some history, I knew that it must be important. Its numerous wars — Russia and Turkey have been at war six times in the last 200 years — the fact that my own country had over its history been constantly involved in virtually every country in the Mediterranean basis and not least because both the Allies and the Axis powers in the last war had tried to occupy it, prove its strategic importance.

I got a clearer view on this when I served in Cyprus in 1956 during the Suez-crisis and in the Persian Gulf in 1968 just before the oil-crisis. But most of

Generaal-majoor Reynolds is in 1930 geboren. In 1950 startte hij zijn loopbaan als officier in het Britse leger. Hij heeft sindsdien diverse belangrijke functies bekleed, waaronder C-ACE Mobile Force (Land). In 1977 doorliep hij het Royal College of Defence Studies in Londen en in 1980 werd hij bevorderd tot generaal-majoor. De onderscheiding „Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath" kreeg hij in 1983. Generaal-majoor Reynolds is in 1986 met pensioen gegaan.

my service, like most Northern Europeans, was spent in the Central region, where the threat was obvious and our strength and that of the Soviets at its greatest.

However, in 1980 I was lucky enough to be given command of the ACE Mobile Force (Land) and my responsibilities switched to the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO. In this new capacity I was privileged for three years to be able to travel all over the Southern region, meet its peoples and the national and NATO commanders, and actually plan with them the real operations we might be called upon to undertake to protect NATO territory; even more I was actually able to exercise my multinational Force alongside national forces in the three land theatres of the Southern region, North-east Italy, Northern Greece, Turkish Thrace, and Eastern Anatolia, as well as to make visits to Portugal and Gibraltar. France and Spain I had to leave for holidays!

Let us look then and try to discover the strategic importance of this vast area. And there we have the first clue: its sheer size. Figures never give a true perspective: 4 million square kilometers! How can anyone visualise 4000 km from Gibraltar to Turkey's eastern border, 1400 km from the coast of North-Africa to the Alps? Perhaps more graphically one should realize that Gibraltar to the Turkish border is the same as New York to San Francisco and that the Central Front is only the same size as Greece's borders with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria or Turkey's with Russia and Iran.

Not only is the Southern region vast but its peoples are the most diverse in the whole of NATO. They are divided by historic, ethnic, social, political, economic and religious factors. It contains the only Moslem country in NATO; it is, as an area, the poorest region in NATO, it is divided from the rest of NATO territory by two neutral countries, Austria and Switzerland; it has long borders, 1800 km, with the Warsaw-Pact and, perhaps most important of all, it is bang up against the most volatile region in the world today — the Middle-East — a region of intense interest and rivalry between the two super-powers.

A brief look at history will give us an insight into the reasons for the many divisions of the Southern region. It is a remarkable fact that over the centuries many attempts have been made to create empires in either whole or various parts of this area: Greeks, Romans, Venetians, Arabs, Turks, Austro-Hungarians, the French, the British and the Germans. The last successful attempt lasted some 400 years with the Ottomans dominating over half the area, large tracts of the Middle-East and most of the North-African coastal countries. Only gradually did this Empire crumble; first Greece obtained its independence in 1830, followed by Serbia, now part of Yugoslavia, and then the other Balkan states and in time the North-African countries and Syria, Jordan, Iran and Iraq. Only after the Second World-War did Turkey lose its old empire and even in the early 1920's Greece and Turkey were still at war. All this time Britain, Germany and France were constantly interfering in the area, keeping the peace and balance as they called it, but often for reasons of trade, self-interest and empire. Russia in its perpetual quest for warm water ports has always eyed the area to its South with envious eyes.

This then is the background to the Southern region, a historical background which is hardly a good basis for a political/military alliance. A background in which all the participants have been at war with one another of their partners throughout history; and of course some of these sources of friction still exist: Gibraltar, the isle of Lemnos, Cyprus, the ethnic problems in Yugoslavia and Turkey, and all around the area: turmoil, to the South, the South-East and the East. Perhaps the only reason for any cohesion at all is the Soviet threat. And here we find that the importance of the Southern region is a direct function of the growing attention devoted to it by the Warsaw-Pact. For many years the problems involving the flanks of Europe were neglected, particularly in the South.

However, now the political and strategic situation has called for a major reappraisal of priorities. In the past Western naval and air superiority in the

Mediterranean was sufficient to guarantee the security of the sea lanes and support of possible land operations. But over the past two decades, ever since Brezhnev declared Russia a Mediterranean power and Admiral Gorshkov gave Russia the military capability to expand its influence, the Southern region had become one of the focal points in world politics and a vital factor in the East-West struggle and North-South-dialogue.

The dynamics of this political transformation have had a major influence on events in the Mediterranean area and thus on the whole of Europe. The endemic instability of the Middle-East countries and those along the North-African coast, the oil problems, the policy of gradual penetration by the Soviet Union and the real likelihood of conflicts arising that vitally affect the common interests of the Western world as a whole or on individual Western nations, have all boosted the strategic importance of the whole area and of Italy, Greece and Turkey in particular. Moreover, the new situation deriving from Soviet expansionism, based on the presence of its fleet in the Mediterranean and the exploitation of the constant state of strife in the Middle-East and North-African areas, has made it all the more important for the NATO countries to remain united in purpose and decisive in decision making.

The last Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe is on record as saying that the accomplishment of his tasks in any war would depend on a secure rear area on the North-African littoral and NATO cannot in my view, ignore Soviet expansionism or influence there or in Syria, Iraq or Iran; at least not without peril. We should always remind ourselves that the major portion of the West's oil requirements come from the Middle-East and for this reason the Middle-East can be considered as a strategic extension of the Mediterranean area. Much of this oil comes through the Suez-Canal and even more, together with raw materials, reaches Southern Europe along the Cape-route and into the Mediterranean. Nor should it be forgotten that due to the seven year war between Iran and Iraq,

virtually all of one of those countries' oil exports now exit through a NATO country.

But let us now take a closer look at some of the nations and areas in the Southern region.

Yugoslavia. Like Austria to its North, NATO has assigned to Yugoslavia a role as a buffer state between its area of responsibility and that of the Warsaw-Pact. Despite serious economic and ethnic problems, it seems reasonably stable and its policy of non-alignment affords NATO a very useful zone of early warning.

The North-African Coast. It is of course, as we all know, outside NATO's area of responsibility but it cannot be ignored. It is characterized by highly differentiated forms of government, often ill-supported by weak internal bases and fragile power structures. The populations of these coastal countries are rapidly out-growing their economy's capacity to support them, despite the development of the latter. With the obvious exception of Libya, none of these countries present any direct or indirect threat to NATO but the unpredictability of political control in the area gives rise to concern and we would be unwise not to keep an eye on events there.

Malta. Because of its geographical positions this small island is of great potential strategic importance. In this perspective NATO was particularly pleased with the Italian/Maltese treaty of 1981, guaranteeing the neutrality of this small nation and excluding its utilization as a base by either super-power. The results of the recent election must also be a cause for satisfaction, although events will tell.

Italy. Central to the area and dominating the sea lanes of communications, Italy is crucial to the Alliance. Its growing political and military prestige, its mediation in East-West and North-South dialogues, its contacts with several African countries and its peace-keeping activities, make it an ideal bridge between Europe and the Middle-East and Africa. ▷

France. In spite of France withdrawing from the military structure of NATO in 1966, she is again crucial to the cohesion of the Southern region. Fortunately her commitment to NATO has never been in doubt and integration has been replaced by cooperation, particularly in the air and sea environments. Again her contacts and historical associations in the Middle-East and African countries are invaluable to NATO and play an important role in influencing events in the area.

Spain. Although not yet and perhaps never to be in the military structure of NATO, Spain is nevertheless firmly in the Western camp. Her entry into the EEC is an important step in ensuring this and of course she provides vital depth in the elongated sausage of the Southern flank. Sadly the problem of Gibraltar is a slight bone of contention but not one that is likely to adversely affect NATO's political cohesion. Gibraltar is of course vital to the security of our sea lanes and could be considered the equivalent of Russia controlling Malta.

And now of course **Greece and Turkey.** Thank God they both remain in the Alliance. If either were antagonistic to the Alliance the strategic situation in the area would alter to a point where the defence of the rest of the area would be at risk. It is, however, a sad fact their historic political differences cause major problems for NATO. Due to these differences we have no proper integrated command and control structures in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Aegean, NATO forces cannot exercise effectively in the area and Turkey is to some extent isolated from the rest of the Alliance. The Aegean islands and Cyprus remain a constant source of friction. Greece does not even consider Turkey a European nation and has stated that she considers Turkey a greater threat to her security than the Warsaw-Pact. It is a fact that one of Greece's army corps faces Turkey as well as Bulgaria and Turkey's 4th or Aegean Army looks West and South and not North or East. These differences affect NATO's day-to-day work, not just in terms of exercises, but in terms of infrastructure work and force planning. However, they both remain in

NATO and one can only hope that eventually more trust will develop between them. They are both vital to Western security; Greece due to her ability to control large areas of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas and Turkey for her control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and as a bastion against the troubles of the Near East. But as I have said, Turkey is a Moslem state and there are more mosques being built there today than in any other country in the area. She also has her ethnic problems.

Before we look at the potential theatres of war in the Southern region, we should perhaps take a brief look at social and economic factors in the area. Unlike the rest of Europe the Mediterranean basin is troubled by weak economies, exploding populations and chronic inflation. The annual percentage increase in population is 2,7 in Turkey, 3,8 in Syria, 3,1 in the Lebanon, 2,8 in Israel, 2,2 in Egypt, 4,2 in Libya and so on; compare this with 0,6 in France, Italy and Northern Europe. Yet despite this and runaway inflation, Turkey spends 5% of its GDP on defence, Greece 7%, compared with an average of 3,4% for all European countries. Greece, Turkey and Portugal have the lowest GDPs in NATO. West-Germany has a GDP nine times higher than Turkey and yet Turkey has the largest standing army in Europe. No wonder the DPC in Brussels every year asks other NATO countries to give military aid to Greece and Turkey and of course Portugal.

Before I turn to the five potential campaign areas in Southern Europe vis-a-vis the Warsaw-Pact, it is important to understand something about the NATO command structure in the region and which countries assign troops in the case of an emergency, either because of their geographical position or through direct or indirect involvement, e.g. by providing external reinforcements. They are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, the UK and the USA. It may surprise some people to know that Portugal has agreed to provide a mechanized brigade to fight in Italy and that the USA has earmarked airborne, marine and infantry units as well as air squadrons for the Italian and Balkan re-

gions. The problem of course is time; will these reinforcements ever arrive in time? There are virtually no stockpiles of equipment, in many cases reception airfields are inadequate and the sea lines of communication are frighteningly long. The AMF(L) for example cannot possibly reach Eastern Turkey in the time laid down by Saceur and due to poor airfields its heavy equipment and much of its ammunition would have to go by sea.

Throughout the whole region the logistic backup for the combat elements is woefully inadequate and the in-place infrastructure and storage sites which we enjoy in the Central region simply do not exist. On the command side there are major weaknesses due to the failure of Greece to properly re-integrate into the military structure. E.g.: we have no 7th ATAF or NATO land HQ to command all the aircraft and ground forces that should operate in the Aegean area in time of crisis.

But let's look now at the five potential campaign areas. The first, and crucial to all the others, is the air battle. Air superiority is vital to success and yet the Warsaw-Pact enjoys a substantial numerical advantage even over fully reinforced Southern region forces. And it is not just numbers, it is also capability. Soviet Fencer and Blackjack aircraft can strike any target in the region from their home bases. I have exercised with Southern region air forces and I know the severe limitations in command and control and capability of many of them. A properly integrated air battle in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean is impossible without modernization and the creation of a 7th ATAF. Compared with the Central region even air control is, I am afraid, in the dark ages.

Next, the sea battle. Southern region's naval forces are responsible for maintaining sea control in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas and for sea denial in the Black Sea. The Mediterranean is the most important geostrategic and characteristic factor of the Southern region. The sea is the main line of communication for supplies and the flow of reinforcements towards the land theatres, as well as being the operational base of the Allied aerial and amphibious forces. It enables the problem of the geographic separation of the land

theatres to be overcome. Yet in recent years the situation has worsened to a serious degree. In 1963 the Mediterranean was a Western lake. Now there are normally 25 Soviet warships, including several submarines and another 25 support ships of one kind or another. In peace this force can be quickly enhanced from the Black Sea; the only good factor here is that NATO would receive early warning as they pass through the Turkish Straits. However, well balanced, modern Soviet forces are faced by NATO forces that have reduced in both strength and capability over the years. Our numbers have reduced, our ships and aircraft have aged and France, with its modern and strong navy, has withdrawn from the integrated structure. The UK, despite its strong representation in Naples, had reduced its Mediterranean commitment to zero. Nevertheless, the situation is still favourable, due mainly to the exceptionally strong US striking forces in the area. However, in my view, it is doubtful if the USA would risk a carrier in the eastern Mediterranean in war and one should realize that two thirds of any carrier's aircraft exist only for its survival and most of the ships in a carrier battlegroup are present only to protect the carrier. On the other side of the coin, I believe the Soviets would be equally mad to risk a carrier in the Mediterranean in the face of Allied air strength.

And now to the land. The first thing to understand is that all these areas are totally different geographically and totally disconnected. No mutual support is possible. They can only be linked by the sea. Reinforcement is extremely difficult; in Italy because of the limited geographic area, in the Balkan area because of access both by sea and air and in Eastern Turkey because of distance, inadequate airfields, poor communications and bad infrastructure.

Taking North-East Italy first. There are two main areas of strategic importance: the river Po valley, the possession of which would separate NATO forces in Central and Southern Europe and destroy Italy's industrial strength, and Central/Southern Italy, the occupation of which would open the way to control of the central Mediterranean.

North-East Italy is characterized by rugged terrain and a wide chain of mountains. It needs relatively few forces to defend it, the only real access being through the Gorizia-Gap North of Trieste. Fortunately Yugoslavia, as I have said, forms a buffer, giving early warning and not a few problems for the Soviets. When one considers that virtually the entire Italian army is there to defend it, I do not believe there is too much of a conventional threat. An internal threat maybe, but the little world of Don Camillo gives me confidence and as a total Italiophile I strongly believe that *international* communism will never flourish in Italy.

Now to the **Balkan front**. The Allied aim here is of course to protect the integrity of NATO territory *and* to *prevent* Soviet access to the Aegean and Mediterranean. Geographically the area varies. In Northern Greece the defence is favoured initially by very rugged terrain, but once through that the enemy has plenty of room to manoeuvre and virtually a free run, as the Germans proved in World War II. In North-Eastern Greece there is no depth: only 20 km from the Bulgarian border to the sea. As far as Greece is concerned she faces threats, after Turkey, from Yugoslavia *and* Bulgaria. The Warsaw-Pact has strong, modern forces in Bulgaria and these can be easily reinforced from the Crimea. Yugoslavia is a different matter and at present the idea of Soviet troops using that country to attack Greece is I believe, a non-starter. However, the strategic importance of Yugoslavia is self-evident and should she ever go firmly into the Soviet-camp the strategic situation for both Greece *and* Italy would change dramatically.

Now if you talk to the Greeks, they will tell you that the Dardanelles are strategically unimportant. They will say that if you want access to the Aegean and Mediterranean there is no point in forcing your way through the Bosphorus and Straits, particularly as everyone knows that the Dardanelles are likely to be an area high on Saceur's initial nuclear strike plan in a crisis. They will say that it is much easier to reach good ports through North-East Greece and gain access that way. Therefore military aid should go to them be-

fore Turkey. They will also say that with Greece strong in the Aegean with all its Greek islands they can prevent movement into the Mediterranean. The Turks of course, take a different view. They will remind you that as late as 1946 the Russians demanded a military garrison in Istanbul to ensure freedom of access for their shipping. Over 50% of Russia's hard currency earning exports and most of her military aid pass through the Straits. They will tell you that the only way to the Aegean and Mediterranean is through the Straits. If they are right then of course there is a problem. Turkish Thrace, apart from the initial mountain range with Bulgaria, is virtually indefensible against modern mechanized forces. It is very flat and not far to Istanbul: 200 km. Of course the threat is to both. If war breaks out, in my view, there will be simultaneous attacks on North-East Greece and Turkish Thrace, probably coupled with airborne and amphibious attacks on both sides of the Bosphorus. And lastly to Turkey's border with Russia in the East. Perhaps the most fascinating to visit. The place where the two countries have always fought before. The place where Turkish forces occupy barracks built by the Russians during their occupation. Rugged, dramatically beautiful, hot in the summer, freezing in the winter; the place where 90,000 Turks froze to death in a previous war at Sarakarmish. The place where I was invited to fight alongside my Turkish allies on the same mountains where the Russians had been fought before. But why? Where are the Russians going if they attack there? West to Ankara and the Dardanelles? Across 1500 km of desperately barren and rugged terrain with virtually no roads? And the oil, the Persian Gulf, the riches of Iran and Iraq lie South, not West. No, I do not believe there is a serious threat there either. The tragedy is that despite all the enormous efforts both the Greeks and Turks make in terms of defence, they are still so vulnerable. Their equipment is old, they cannot properly exercise their tanks, ships or aircraft because of fuel costs and perhaps most tragically of all, they will all die anyway if the Soviets use chemical weapons, because they have no modern defences against such weapons.

No, I do not see an imminent conventional military threat to any of these areas. I do not believe that the Soviets intend to strike the „soft underbelly” of Europe, as Churchill described it, as a way of bringing about a political and military collapse in Central Europe. The Soviets *are* intent on bringing about sympathetic, communist if possible, governments in the area; particularly in strategically important countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Greece and Italy. In this way they *can* turn Europe’s Southern flank into a soft underbelly, they can place a strangle hold on Central Europe’s economy, bring about political unrest and make it ripe for political upheaval. They *can* prevent US influence and reduce US military potential in the Mediterranean and they can obtain warm water ports and extend their power into the oil-rich Middle-East. But we should not forget that they also have problems and not just in extending their power and influence; Moslem countries are, in the main, violently antagonistic to Soviet ideas and influence. The Soviets already have a major problem with the Moslem minorities, which number some 60 million, in their own country. They have already had their fingers burnt in Afghanistan and their experience in Egypt can hardly have been reassuring.

No, the threat to the Southern region is not an attack by modern Soviet military forces but comes from political instability due to overspending on arms, inflation, poverty, overpopulation and lack of modernization. I have seen villages across the region but particularly in northern Greece and Turkey, where the roads are unpaved, there is lit-

le or no sanitation and where the men have no work and leave what there is to the women. These villages are swarming with children who receive only the most basic education. Villages whose people have never heard of NATO, who have no vision of a united Europe, who remember only war, deprivation and perhaps even occupation by foreign troops. But these same people *do* have TV’s and radios, at least in the village coffee shop, where they can see the so-called good life of the West, see the results if US bombing raids on Libya, and hear Soviet and Bulgarian propaganda in the radio. It is no wonder, in view of the conditions in which they live, that the country areas are being depopulated, that cities like Athens, Ankara and Istanbul are bulging as it seems with people who have no proper homes and little hope of good jobs; creating conditions perfect for communist propaganda and unrest. In my view the stability of the area will be maintained not only by military preparedness, although that of course is essential too, but by creating work, and through it, better standards of living and better expectations for the mass of the people.

The real key to peace in the Southern region, so essential to peace in Europe and the Western world, is a real improvement in the quality of life of its inhabitants. The real threat is the lack of dignity of men and women in an area too close for comfort to the Soviet empire and to the Middle-East with its turmoil, revolutions and cries of Jihad. That, I believe, is the real threat to the Southern region of NATO.



The relevance of NATO's Southern region

F. Trupiano

lid Italiaanse permanente vertegenwoordiging bij de NAVO

The Southern region of NATO comprises an area of more than 4,5 million kilometers. It includes not only the land and air defence of Italy, Greece and Turkey, but also the sea lanes of communication in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The land borders alone are some 2700 km in length from Tarviso, in Northern Italy, to Eastern Turkey. In this region Turkey shares 610 km of land frontiers with the Soviet Union, while Greece shares nearly 450 km of land frontiers with Bulgaria, the Soviets' most loyal ally. Furthermore, all areas of the Southern region are divided and at the same time united by the Mediterranean basin: one of the most volatile and unstable areas of the world.

One could say that the Mediterranean is a world in itself; it is the only area of the globe where four societies — i.e. Western democracies, communist regimes, oil producers and developing countries — live together in such close proximity.

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish in the Mediterranean a clear-cut distinction between East-West situations and regional situations. The latter have interrelated historical, religious, political and economic origins and, by their nature, are more connected with North-South relations. The Mediterranean Sea itself is of vital economic importance to all countries in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. At any given

De heer Trupiano is in 1946 in Palermo geboren. Na beëindiging van zijn studie rechten begon hij zijn carrière bij de Italiaanse diplomatieke dienst. Tot 1985 heeft hij functies vervuld op het Italiaanse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken en bij de Italiaanse ambassades in Londen en Nairobi. Sinds september 1985 is hij politiek raadsman bij de permanente Italiaanse delegatie van de NAVO te Rome.

moment, some 2000 merchant vessels, including 250 to 300 belonging to the Soviet Union, are present in the Mediterranean. Between 300 and 400 of these are tankers, carrying up to 30 million barrels of petroleum products. All imports of petroleum into Italy and Greece pass through the Mediterranean, as do 50% of those destined for France, Spain and Germany.

Thus all allied countries have a strong interest in ensuring that the freedom of the sea is safeguarded.

The concept of security has consequently been broadened to include petroleum supplies and trade routes, making the Mediterranean a component of the stability not only of Southern European borders, but of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Moreover, as the Middle-East and the Gulf have become increasingly inseparable, so have these areas been inextricably linked in geostrategic terms to the Mediterranean Sea and its littoral states.

In 1949 the Mediterranean and the Southern region were considered of secondary importance to Western defence. The NATO Central front was the defensive priority, while the Southern flank was considered an appendage of the Central front. In the post-war years, the Mediterranean was something of a Western lake; from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles it was the uncontested dominion of the Western powers. This situation persisted until the mid 1960's. However, by 1967 — at the time of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War — the strategic situation of that area had changed radically.

In April 1967, in a statement at Karlovy Vary,

Leonid Brezhnev declared the Soviet Union to be a Mediterranean power and its antagonist to be the American Sixth Fleet. In 1968, the helicopter-carrier 'Moskva' made its spectacular entrance into the Mediterranean. All this appeared to be putting into practice Admiral Gorshkov's theory of the Soviet Navy as a foreign policy instrument with worldwide applications.

Since that time, by exploiting the tension in the region, the Soviet Union has consistently strengthened its maritime force in the Mediterranean, passing from an average of five ships daily in 1964, to from 46 to 48 in recent years. At present, the composition of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (Sovmedron) includes 6 to 7 surface combatants (1 cruiser plus 5 to 6 destroyers and frigates) and 6 to 7 submarines, supported by some 20 to 26 auxiliaries.

The Soviet naval forces' mission in the Mediterranean is both of a military and political nature. From a military standpoint, Sovmedron's missions in peacetime are:

- to watch over the activities of the US Sixth fleet and reduce its freedom to manoeuvre;
- in times of crisis, to prevent the American fleet from intervening and to increase the risk of any possible action against countries friendly to the Soviet Union;
- in case of conflict, to speedily undertake offensive action against the Sixth Fleet.

From a political standpoint, its aims are:

- to display the Soviet Union's maritime presence and power in the region;
- to present the Soviet Union as a potential protector and increase Soviet influence in the Arab countries;
- to demonstrate that the USSR is now a legitimate Mediterranean power and therefore that the Mediterranean can no longer be considered as an exclusive Western domain.

Obviously the Soviet Navy operates in the Mediterranean under a series of restrictions. For the time being, all points of access to this sea, from Gibraltar to Suez to the Turkish Straits, are control-

led by NATO powers or by a friendly state. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's efforts over the years to gain access to Mediterranean ports have yielded mixed results. Still today, the Sovmedron has no logistic shore structures and is primarily maintained by rotation of surface ships from the Baltic Sea fleet and submarines from the Northern and Baltic fleets (the Montreux Convention prohibits the transit of submarines from the Black Sea). In the absence of naval bases, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is therefore supplied at anchorages in international waters, off the coast of various countries (Tunisia, Libya, Greece, Italy). However, even with these restrictions, the Soviet Navy, supported by a growing air potential, constitutes a very serious threat, which must be taken into account and contained.

Another aspect of the strategic significance of the Mediterranean derives directly from its geographic location as a meeting point of North and South, East and West. Europe and Afro-Asia, as a bridge linking the West to the energy sources in the Persian Gulf. The importance of this aspect has tremendously increased in the last 15 years, in the aftermath of the energy shortage of the 1970's, the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq conflict.

The sphere of the Mediterranean problems has widened, becoming much more complex and dangerous. It now involves the whole of Western relations, not only with the Arab world, but with the Islamic one, more generally.

With its military presence in Afghanistan and the potential projection of its own offensive capability towards the Persian Gulf, the Soviet Union could interfere directly with Western security. In an East-West conflict, the oil weapon could take on particular importance if the USSR were to gain control of the sources of supply. Furthermore, the invasion of Afghanistan can also be seen as part of a strategy aimed at finding an exit route for Soviet forces across the Arabian peninsula or the African continent, so as to outflank the Mediterranean from the South. >

There is still another factor to consider, both for the military aspects of a possible conflict and for the national security requirements of the European allies bordering on the Mediterranean. That is the behaviour and the improved military capacity of some Middle-Eastern and North-African countries. This qualitative and quantitative improvement in the maritime forces in particular of most of the North-African countries would constitute a threat to the security of the Alliance, and to that of individual member nations, should any of those North-African countries be enticed into the direct orbit of the Warsaw-Pact or in some way demonstrate a sustained pattern of hostile behaviour. Hand in hand with this threat goes the problem of terrorism and the Western concern with countries such as Libya, Syria and Iran, which at times have been linked to such activities.

All this brings us to touch briefly upon the geographical limits of the Alliance and the problem of the so-called 'out of area'.

The North-Atlantic Treaty contains a clear definition of the Treaty area. While this definition does not include the Middle-East and North-Africa, it clearly includes the Mediterranean as such. However it is evident that — as stated in the Three Wise Men's report of 1956 — *the influence and the interests of the NATO members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty and that the common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area.* This concept was reaffirmed in the Harmel-report of 1967, which clearly states that *the North Atlantic Treaty Area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world.*

Most recently, the 1982 Bonn summit recognized the need to take into consideration developments occurring outside of the area covered by the Treaty, which could threaten the vital interests of the members of the Alliance. It is clear, however, that 'out of area'-events may be dealt with through a process of close consultation and, eventually, bilateral support decided on a case-by-case basis, rather than through the established procedures of the integrated defence structure of the Alliance.

All of the elements we have indicated up to now clearly demonstrate the increasing importance of the Southern flank and of the Mediterranean area for the security of the Alliance as a whole.

From the strategic point of view, it is clear that the primacy given to the Central front in the early post-war period is no longer justified. The strategic centre of gravity of the Atlantic Alliance has shifted away from Central Europe towards the South. The Mediterranean and Central Western Europe will either stand or fall together. Having lost the Elbe and Rhine position, it would be impossible for the Mediterranean world to withstand the pressure of the European continental mass. At the same time, the Mediterranean has always been and is now more than ever, the route for the potential outflanking of Central Europe. The fact that an enemy might take possession of its shores and that such an enemy could easily break up Mediterranean defence lines, might mean that the Central front would, in turn, become indefensible.

From a military point of view, control of the Mediterranean is crucial to the Alliance even in peacetime, in order to secure unrestricted movement of NATO maritime forces and maintain the vital link between the United States and European members of the Alliance.

The recognition by all the NATO allies of the crucial strategic importance of the Southern region countries has already set in motion a process of reinvigorating the European military presence in the area. This is in full application of the principle of fair sharing of defence and security responsibilities among the members of the Alliance.

Each member of the Southern region plays a significant role in ensuring the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Turkey is the only NATO member facing the Warsaw-Pact threat from two opposing directions: furthermore, the two land fronts in Turkey (the Thrace/Straits area and Eastern Turkey) are separated from one another by a distance of 2000 km. Strategically speaking, Turkey contains the Soviet access routes to the Middle-East and Persian Gulf

region and serves as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean and Aegean seas.

From the perspective of the Alliance's defence, Turkey is therefore committed to defending three separate fronts: Turkish Thrace, the North-Eastern border with the Soviet Union and the Bosphorus. It is worth mentioning at this point that the Turkish Straits in particular are of vital economic and military importance to the Soviet Union; half of the Soviet merchant fleet is based in the Black Sea; nearly 40% of Soviet exports and 50% of Soviet imports move through the Straits; the control of the Straits would be necessary in order for the Black Sea fleet — which now numbers nearly 400 ships — to gain unlimited access to the Mediterranean.

To fulfill its commitments to the common defence, Turkey spends about 4.4% of its GDP and provides more than 700,000 men under arms (the second largest armed force in NATO and the largest land force in Western Europe). The chronic problem always facing the Turkish armed forces is that of modernizing their equipment, which is one generation behind that of most other NATO countries.

Greece's geostrategic position is equally important. First, Greece provides continuity for the Alliance's Southern region, not only for purpose of military communications, but also in protecting Italy from the East and Turkey from the West. Second, the Greek land mass, along with the nearly 3,000 islands, gives strategic depth to Alliance defence. Third, because of its very location, Greece is crucial to protect the shipping lanes of the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Egypt and the Suez Canal, while the Greek air space is vital for access to the Middle-East and North-Africa.

The Greek defence effort is demonstrated by the fact that this country provides the largest personnel force level as a percentage of the active population (6.2%) and spends in total defence the highest percentage of Gross Domestic Product (7.1%). Modernization of Greek forces is supported through defence aid from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

At this stage however, one cannot avoid mentioning a domestic problem for NATO: the longstanding confrontations between Greece and Turkey over the status of Cyprus, air and sea rights in the Aegean and the question of militarization of certain Greek Islands. Certainly this quarrel is a source of concern for the Alliance, both in political and military terms. It is a problem that must be handled with the greatest care, taking into account both the security interests of the Alliance, and the positions and susceptibilities of the two countries involved.

The Italian peninsula, extending for more than 10° latitude, is the last wall protecting the Western Mediterranean and, at the same time, is already part of the very heart of Europe. Italy is a vital link between the Central and Southern members of the Alliance, and is in a position to monitor the East-West sea lanes of communication in the Mediterranean.

In the North, the possession of the Po valley has been through the centuries a decisive factor for victory or defeat in the central region of Europe. In the South, the possession of Sicily is clearly fundamental for the control of the central Mediterranean.

Until a few years ago, the potential military threat to the North-Eastern frontier was the principal problem with which Italy was concerned inside NATO, and this formed the basis of Italian defence planning; however developments in the Mediterranean region have created another danger. According to the 1985 Italian Defence White Paper, the primary threat is to the sea lanes of communication, to the Italian and Mediterranean air space and to Italy's infrastructure, which are all essential for reinforcement, and tactical and logistical supply. Italy's defence planning is therefore paying more attention to the possible threats arising from the inherently unstable conditions in many Mediterranean countries and, in particular, to the possibility of air-sea attacks from the South. The presence of Italy in the center of the Mediterranean implies political and strategic responsibilities of which the Italian government is fully aware. ▷

That is why Italy has been available for peace-keeping missions in the Sinai, in Lebanon, and in the Red Sea, and, since 1980, has signed bilateral agreements with Malta providing for economic assistance and military guaranties for the neutrality and non-alignment status of that country. For the same reason, Italy has been ready to intervene on a diplomatic level in all efforts at dialogue or persuasion, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to contain regional crises originating in the Mediterranean area; the decision to install cruise missiles in Comiso, as well as the recent measure adopted to strengthen the capacity and mobility of the Italian security system, are manifestations of this attitude.

All three Southern flank allies are carrying out an intensive modernization program of their defensive, logistic and communications structures. It is a considerable effort aimed at maintaining an adequate level of deterrence, clearly recognizable to all potential aggressors. To this end, the Alliance as a whole must continue to provide, and even increase, financial assistance and armaments cooperation to Greece and Turkey (two of three less industrialized countries) in order to help them in their effort to modernize their military equipment and defence systems.

The foregoing leads to the following conclusions.

— The Southern region is today, and will be in the future, an area in which the Alliance could face some of its most serious challenges.

— The largest potential threat comes from the very large land and air forces of the Soviet Union.

However, while the main challenge is still posed by the Warsaw-Pact, it would be simplistic and incorrect to analyse Southern region affairs as if the sole threat were the Soviet presence in the area and the only danger a clash between the super-powers.

The most immediate, but smaller scale, threat weighing on Allied security in the Mediterranean comes from existing or potential local conflicts spilling over from the Middle-East or arising on the littoral. Such conflicts present the inherent risk

of a direct Soviet-American involvement. The political stability of certain countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and along the North-African coast is uncertain. Any abrupt change of regime may lead to a change in political alignment favouring the Soviet Union and posing the threat of Soviet naval and air bases on the shores of the Mediterranean. Moreover, crises and tensions in the Mediterranean can have negative effects on both the East-West dialogue and, more generally on the climate of trust and peaceful co-existence of international society.

In the face of such persistent threats to Allied security in the Southern region, the Allies must make a new commitment, both military (in order to ensure an adequate level of deterrence) and political (to defuse dangerous local crises). Security, especially in the Mediterranean, is not merely a military problem, but implies political-diplomatic action to increase the interdependence and common interests of peoples and governments. It also implies perseverance and a constant commitment to seek appropriate solutions to overcome crises and tensions in the area.

In this context, European countries can and, I think, *must* play a more active role. They should make every effort to solve local problems in a regional framework in order to prevent them from becoming part of the East-West confrontation.

I would like to conclude these observations by quoting the report on the security in the Mediterranean presented last year to the 32nd Ordinary session of the Western European Union assembly:

Security in the Mediterranean depends very much on the maintenance of good relations with all the non-aligned countries of the area and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to all actual or potential conflicts. Success in these aims will depend very much more on diplomatic and economic relations than on traditional military power (. . .) The cohesion of the Alliance and the pursuit of coordinated policies by NATO and European Community countries are more important for the preservation of peaceful and stable conditions (. . .) than any purely military measures.

Military-operational aspects and Southern flank security

M. Hübner

Oberst-Leutnant der Bundeswehr; IISS

I appreciate the honour to speak in front of such a distinguished audience as well as in the line of experts who have addressed you already. May I add some aspects to the overall subject of Mediterranean security. I should point out however, that I express — as a member of the IISS — my own opinion and take a personal responsibility for all statements.

I will address the military operational aspects and their impact to Southern flank security. The main emphasis is on military questions. To bring military implications, however, into effect, the political assessment and guidance of NATO in general, or individual countries in particular are of vital concern. Therefore, the mechanism of crisis management as the technical vehicle to drive a crisis or to win a war by military means, must be described, as far as the Mediterranean is concerned. In other words, military operational aspects in the Southern region cannot be described without the political implementation measures. Let me form therefore three major parts to speak about:

- *Crisis management* as the overall political umbrella for any implementation in peacetime, crisis and war and their interference to the Southern region.
- *The threat and force comparisons* including:

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- the sustainability of NATO forces;
- command, control and communication structure;
- reinforcement procedures.
- *Improvements* on their way (with a summary and conclusions).

Given that it is unlikely to count divisions, aircraft and ships alone. A trend and a balance-of-power analysis might be necessary to describe the overall problem.

I will not cover political sensibilities between the individual countries as well as maritime aspects. Both form an individual item on your agenda.

The urgency of crisis management in Southern Europe

The strategic environment in Europe has evolved considerably since NATO's founding, creating new regional pressures which may encourage the Soviet Union to probe the sustainability of the Alliance. The salient features of a Warsaw-Pact threat in the Mediterranean theatre are as follows. In Northern Greece and Turkish Thrace the Warsaw-Pact could commit 34 Soviet, Roumanian and Bulgarian divisions to this theatre, 22 of which are largely mechanized forces in a high state of readiness. Other forces could be drawn from the Carpathian and Odessa district; forces from the Kiev district could reinforce these units. In Eastern Turkey 20 Soviet divisions are available, roughly 12 of which are forward deployed. Reinforcements could be drawn from the Odessa or Volga districts. Against Northern Italy 10 Soviet and Hungarian divisions are available with 7 additional ones ready for reinforcement. ▷

All theatres can be additionally reinforced by air assault, mobile and amphibious forces. The recent reorganization of the Soviet air force into 20 regional commands and five air armies complicates an analysis of Soviet air assets which could be committed to a Southern region conflict. In short, however, Warsaw-Pact in-place land and air forces are superior to those of NATO. I do exclude maritime assets, which may be covered by the Afsouth representatives later.

In addition to this imminent threat, NATO however, could be drawn into other conflicts by three possible courses of action, regardless the fact that the Warsaw-Pact engages itself directly or indirectly by taking the position of one or more countries involved.

First there could be escalatory events in the Near and the Middle-East and the Southern littoral which inflict NATO countries in the Mediterranean region. Spain could be faced with the loss of its exclaves Ceuta and Mellila at the Southern littoral. Would the country solve those problems by itself or would it call for assistance in accordance with article 6 of the NATO treaty, which applies collective defence to the national territories of the member states? Will Italy, suffering losses by a Libyan attack at the island of Lampedusa, counter by military action and ask for support by the 6th (US) Fleet cruising in the Mediterranean? Will Turkey judge combattant actions of the Iraq-Iranian war extending on its territory as a strict bilateral issue? These problems will be given additional impetus, if a Warsaw-Pact country takes a position of one of the non-aligned countries involved in a possible conflict.

Second, a US commitment of bilateral character in a Southern or neighbouring area is of importance for NATO as a whole. The influence of the Middle-East oil to the economic stability of the Western world may lead to an out-of-area operation by (US) forces, which are suitable to conduct this type of combat action. Neither NATO nor NATO nations appear to have sufficiently acknowledged the nature of the problem or to make appropriate and feasible responses.

The third case could again be a bilateral conflict between NATO countries. The Turkish-Greek dispute serves as a good example. Not only political issues, which may be solved at the conference table, deteriorate the climate. The menace of moving the defence forces against the border of a threatening NATO member is used as a basic argument in the daily political discussion. Although the move is still missing, the situation in itself is uncomfortable enough. Could we have similar problems, if Spain ultimately requests the return of Gibraltar under national authority? It is evident, that the external threat to the Southern region is augmented by the challenge to deter the internal threat of imminent conflicts weakening and eroding the Alliance. The internal political problems of the Alliance in Southern Europe are unlikely to change. The future positions of Iran in the configuration of powers, if the war against Iraq will be won, is unpredictable. The reaction of a beaten Iraq, as well as vice versa, in the correlation of the Arabian world could be the beginning of a dramatic destabilization in the Middle-East region with direct impact on the Mediterranean. This kind of a threat requires an efficient mechanism to deter any aggression with the highest amount of credibility. But the situation in the Mediterranean makes it even more complicated than in other areas to achieve such a goal. The geography reduces any flexibility of NATO's reaction. Contingency plans are to be provided for four possible land combat theatres: the Iberian peninsula, Italy, Greek/Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey. The Mediterranean itself forms the fifth (maritime) theatre. No other region has such a multiplicity of military headquarters at so many levels throughout such a huge area.

How to face this challenge throughout peacetime, crisis and war by means of the current NATO strategic concept? The NATO strategic concept of flexible response not only offers opportunities for consultation but emphasises the need for collective decision-making on a wide variety of diplomatic, economic and military measures which would have to be implemented by the Alliance of the es-

sential interests or security of its members were to be safeguarded in a crisis. The aims of crisis managements in NATO may be:

- to *prevent the outbreak of war* and to *resolve the crisis*;
- to ensure *civil and military preparedness* in case an armed conflict cannot be avoided;
- to *provide political guidance* and strategic direction to the major NATO Commanders *before* and after the outbreak of hostilities.

Theoretically, the mechanism is well described, how to function even with matters beyond the NATO-area of interest, i.e. the Southern littoral of the Mediterranean. The system for discussion and consultation, which has been gradually been built up, based on the firm declarations, is elaborate and applies to Southern Europe as well as to other areas of the Alliance. In practice, achieving unanimity is complex. There are only sovereign states, equal in status, which are required to come to a common consensus. What does this mean? One might assume that Bulgaria is causing political threat by maintaining a permanent pressure on the Turkish minority in its country. In addition to this Bulgarian forces do not return into their garrisons after long lasting field exercises. But not enough, the Northern Fleet is cruising with more ships than usual still in international, but close to North-Norwegian territorial waters. Turkey applies for a political declaration of NATO's concern about the imminent threat and the initiations of the deployment of the (Allied Commander Europe) Mobile force in the area of Turkish Thrace, should the tension continue to rise. This scenario to declare a firm political will requires, for example, the agreement of France in the Council and the preparedness of Norway to set the own case of national security behind the Turkish request to be decided within the DPC. This is only the political case.

The major NATO commanders' responsibilities in the field of crisis management include the provision of their personal assessment during the consultation and the political decision-making process. That is all what they can do (once the military mechanism, they command, is prepared to

react) before they receive guidance in whatever crisis may occur. If it comes to a decision, their problems in taking this into proper military action within their area of responsibility, simply start.

Preparation has to be carried out in peacetime. An adequate military mechanism, which functions by proper means, enables the politicians to make use of the crisis management mechanism as a whole. This simply means the completion of agreed contingency plans and the organization and training of assigned and designated units and formations.

Exercises have to be planned and carried out with the co-operation and permission of national governments. Communication lines, support facilities and an air defence organization have to be set up virtually under the same responsibilities which they would assume in war. Because of the very large geographical areas to be covered in Southern Europe by such an organization, individual national measures have to be strongly co-ordinated already in peacetime.

The geostrategic conditions of the Southern flank contrast sharply with NATO's Central front of Northern flank where the Soviet Union is a clear and present danger. In the centre NATO and Warsaw-Pact forces occupy established positions and are assigned counter balanced roles. They are supported by an elaborate logistical infrastructure as well as transportation networks that have been developed over thirtyfive years. Even if the Northern flank is far off the optimum, there are many advantages for defence preparations: only two local governments (Norway, Denmark) are involved and a more uncomplicated command structure is set up, prestructuring and communication networks are well advanced and there is a geographic structure, which shows up to the advantage of the defender in comparison with the aggressor.

As mentioned earlier, a direct confrontation of the superpowers or an attack by the Warsaw-Pact in the Mediterranean is most unlikely. It cannot be ignored, however, that the USSR is driving military policies and programmes to field forces sufficiently large and intimidating to underwrite this foreign policy and to use it for achieving political

objectives. Within this broad context, the continuing rapid deployment of increasingly mobile and effective weapon systems in all type-forces, provides a balanced improvement across all categories of military capability.

Force comparisons and sustainability of NATO forces in the Mediterranean

Static assessments of the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw-Pact are an important indicator of the own strength in the region. However, a more complete picture of the overall stand and of the respective forces also requires an appreciation of the operational context in which the forces might face each other. For deterrence to prevail, NATO forces in the Southern region must be sufficient to convince any aggressor that any objections one might seek to achieve by attacking will be denied.

At the first glance, it would appear that the military balance of East-West forces on the Southern flank is reasonable. Tank imbalances in the South are acceptable as they are 2 to 1. Artillery and mortar balances can be counted on a rough parity. The air balance ratio in the South is 2,5 to 1 in favour of the Warsaw-Pact, which is again acceptable. Offsetting Soviet naval power are combined NATO forces, including the Sixth Fleet, which are clearly stronger than their Soviet counterparts. But these numbers do not tell the whole story. The minor deficiencies which arise in static comparisons with Warsaw-Pact forces in the Southern region are unfigured by factors inherent in their operational deployment. The conditions, however, under which individual national forces have to face a threat, reveal a more discouraging picture.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the Turkish forces form the second largest force of NATO. The Turkish navy and air force can count on rapid reinforcements by the local Allied tactical air force elements and the 6th Fleet, where necessary. The land forces, however, have to take the burden basically alone to fight at three possible theatres, before external reinforcement arrive: Eastern Tur-

key, Southern Turkey and Turkish Thrace. As the commander in the Turkish land forces stated in 1985,

. . . the Turkish Army has no problems in the area of trained manpower, instruction, training, discipline and morale. However, it must be stressed once more that modernization is an essential requirement for the Army since most of the weapon systems and equipment in the inventory are of World War II and Korean War vintage and have completed their lives.

One could not agree more, if the adverse climate conditions of Eastern and Southern Anatolia are added to the overall equipment problem. The Turkish soldier, brave and willing to fight up to the utmost, must dig into the ground and sustain in over-stretched front lines with personal equipment which is the bare minimum for Western standards. Small arms ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles and artillery shells, mines, explosives for obstacle constructions will be dramatically reduced under heavy attack and cannot be replaced quickly because of the adverse climate and terrain conditions. The high and difficult terrain in Eastern Anatolia, where the invading army has little choice of routes or places of engagement, in conjunction within the familiarity and adaptation of the Turkish soldier, favours the defender. However, the wide plains in Southern Anatolia (facing the Syrian-Iraq border) and Turkish Thrace are in favour for highly mechanized and armoured battle.

For conclusion, the strong manpower of the Turkish Army, often praised in NATO context, will not solve the strategic problem of a high intensive, (air)mobile and mechanized front attack. The Turkish soldier can sustain in the first front line, but assuming that he might be isolated there and the battle might move in depth, there is a vital lack of mechanized and air-mobile reserves, which can deny a further approach. Strategically, it could mean first, the loss of the land control of the Turkish Straits, second, in the count of a deep strike through Central Anatolia in conjunction with an attack out of Syria it could further mean the loss of the Turkish harbours, oil facilities and airfields

between Adana and Iskederun and the Turkish mainland.

The Balkan Front, to be covered by Greek land forces, extends 1200 km from Corfu and the Albanian coast eastward to the Black Sea and forms, as the inner-German border does, the longest direct frontline against the Warsaw-Pact area of influence. The land varies from high and rugged mountain ridges to a small piece of rolling hills next to the Turkish border. While terrain initially favours the defender, successful penetration of the forward defensive positions is, as well as in Turkey, of serious consequence, since there is a shortage of mechanized reserves and the manoeuvre area remaining is extremely small. It is, for example, only 25 km at the narrowest point in Eastern Greece from Bulgaria to the Aegean shore. A Greek saying, that 'if Thessaloniki is lost, Greece will be lost', applies.

The Greek army keeps 165.000 soldiers under arms. This amount forms, in comparison with the Turkish army (542.000 soldiers), only less than one third. The Greek army, however, has to protect only one front as long as the political leaders do not judge the Turkish forces as a threat which justifies an additional front. We heard about a new Greek defence concept, which considers Turkey as a possible invader.

There is no reason to compare the bravery of the Turkish and Greek soldier. However, setting quality of personal equipment, availability of basic supply items in a high-intensive battle, quality of long-line communication, deployment and mobility of reserves against the sustainability of land forces, both armies have similar problems.

The situation in Italy is somewhat better. Even the Italian Army has to defend the highly industrialized areas of the North-Italian river plains, it is backed up by the Alpine border with nearly no easy access through, and the Gorizia gap, the single approach through the Yugoslavian mountains from the East. The fact that an attack has to be launched through neutral or non-aligned countries, guarantees a longer warning-time than in the other theatres before. The first line of defence is at the

border, with second and third defensive positions along the major rivers to the West. Mechanized and armoured forces can be employed effectively here, and planned covering force operations are both elaborate and well rehearsed. The only short-fall, which could be identified, is a failure of the Turkish and/or Greek frontlines, which might hazard the theatre as a whole, the Italian front included.

As a worst case alternative, the Iberian land forces have to be included in NATO contingency planning, although Spain actually refuses a military contribution to the Alliance under the following circumstances: either NATO has lost the conventional battle in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean and the war spreads over into the West, or Portuguese and/or Spanish land forces are needed as external reinforcements in the above mentioned theatres. A Portuguese brigade has already a contingency mission in Northern Italy.

The Spanish army, 230.000 soldiers strong, currently undergoes an extensive and historic programme of reorientation and reintroduction to the international security area. The reorganization and modernization — keeping NATO-countries in mind — targets the ability to perform combat missions instead of gendarmerie functions. A large percentage of units fall below NATO standards not only in terms of size, but also in terms of equipment and the number and duration of exercises and manoeuvres performed over a given period. Consequently, some units have the necessary training and equipment to deal with a NATO contingency, but a number of others fall below acceptable level of operational readiness.

Portuguese armed forces have undergone a profound transition in organization, mission, size, and capability in the past decade and were dramatically reduced. The armed forces have decreased from 200.000 to about 73.000. The army consists of about 40.000 and only 2 brigades are considered to meet NATO-standards.

Final strategic conventional decisions are to be achieved by land forces. The lack of an overall conventional land force sustainability in the Mediterranean is imminent. To make the picture com-

plete. however, the ability to fight a combined-arms battle might be put under consideration. Particularly in Greece and Turkey, NATO is confronted with a difficult air defence problem. All NATO military operations in the Southern region rely on capable air support and air defence. Command and control procedures and devices available must deal with high-speed low altitude aircraft and make timely interception possible. Protection must be given to airfields, ports and staging areas behind the front.

The balance sheet on current air capabilities in the region shows that, although the situation is improving, NATO is not now capable of establishing air superiority except in limited local areas for a limited period of time.

The Southern region air ratio is 2,5 to 1 in favour of Warsaw-Pact forces. This could be as I said an acceptable balance if the overall equipment would not be outdated. Much of the aircraft available to Turkey and Greece is over twenty years old. As an analyst observes, fewer than one half of Turkey's planes are combat-ready, spare parts inventories are low or non-existent and many planes have been cannibalized for parts. Pilots' training, consequently, has been limited. Only Italy is moving currently toward rapid modernization with the introduction of the multipurpose Tornado into its inventory.

The Portuguese air force is very small and not consequential as a combat or air defence force. Spain has attempted to keep more abreast of modernizing trends although its forces need upgrading.

As long, as one has to assume, that both Iberian air forces will complete domestic air defence missions from their home bases, the ability to become effective in a Central or Eastern Mediterranean air scenario, will be simply limited by range problems.

All armed forces can probably handle an opposing force under relatively unsophisticated conventional and static conditions, but in a highly dynamic battle in the sophisticated environment of nbc, electronic warfare and heavy air attacks the for-

mations become more than vulnerable. The additional lack of logistical sustainability, ordnance, spare parts, limited pre-stocking or ammunition and other vital support items could drive to unwanted escalation.

For the time being, NATO's greatest compensating advantage lies in its ability to dominate the Mediterranean by the naval forces. This advantage, however, might be overcome, as more as these forces and its aircraft-capabilities are bound in deteriorating the Soviet threat against themselves exclusively and are not available for general support of local land operations.

The naval forces might be fixed in a new, upcoming mission: to defeat the increasing amphibious capacity of the Warsaw-Pact forces. There is an increasing interest — for example — by the Italian authorities in the possibility of an air-sea attack from the Southern shorelines. This has led, in Italian defence planning, to a diversification of the attention formerly focussed on the Northeast as the most likely area of conflict. The possibility that, during a crisis, the Soviet Union might gain the support of other nations in geographic proximity to NATO's Southern region is now an understandable concern. This option, however, opens a new threat to all NATO Mediterranean countries with long coastlines and deteriorates the overall capability to sustain a conventional battle.

In sum, deterrence requires that a high degree of doubt exists in the mind of a potential aggressor that he may be denied his objectives. As far as the conventional sustainability of NATO forces in the Southern region is concerned, the deficiencies are not yet overcome. The disparity in capabilities and numbers, particularly in aircraft, air defence, armour, logistics, communication and in personal equipment of the individual soldier, is likely to persist for some time if not indefinitely. It may be compensated by organizational and operational considerations. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the command structure, command, control and communication, readiness training and reinforcements in the Southern region.

Structural problems of command

As stated earlier, the Southern region is the largest of the Allied Command Europe's four military regions to defend. In general, all measures must be taken, to preserve the integrity of Southern region states, deny to the greatest extent possible Soviet access to the Mediterranean, and protect sea lines and lanes of communication. As Cincsouth has recently written:

Maintaining control of the Mediterranean, gaining and keeping supremacy in the air over the region, and containing the Warsaw-Pact armies are (...) vital to the defence of all NATO, not just the Southern region.

This is, nevertheless, one of the 'key-mission-components', Saceur has developed in his 'Conceptual Military Framework', which provides guidance for priority of long-term planning areas and the capabilities needed by Allied Command Europe to implement them. There are military actions and procedures required, which demonstrates NATO's ability and resolve to deter aggression and to defend NATO territory. All these requirements to set up an efficient military organization have to be reflected against the overall Alliance posture: the political reaction is well organized, unanimous and well in time. Consequently, the military manifestation should clearly mirror the political will.

Is the NATO military command structure in Southern Europe able to meet such a high-angle requirement? The current situation makes it more than complicated. There is a huge organization set up with about 5000 servicemen and women of the Southern region countries assigned to the various integrated headquarters and necessary support units. But Cincsouth has to fight himself through a series of basic problems being related to the system, before he gets his decisions converted into action. These problems are imminent in the structure and do not apply to technical shortfalls in the field of command, control and communications, which I will not cover in further detail.

Uncertainties start — within the chain of com-

mand — above Cincsouth. He might not be sure to have all military formations available — especially external reinforcements — he has on his contingency list. Saceur is Commander-in-Chief of all NATO forces in Europe as well as National commander of all US forces deployed in the continent. He might assess another main effort as in the Southern region and deploy reinforcements into other areas than in the South.

The complexity of the numerous NATO commands as well as the non-existence of NATO headquarters in peacetime complicates an efficient command and control. The malfunctions to be derived from these facts are basically of military-technical and functional nature. The variety of nations concerned, however, comprises psychological problems. The goodwill of originating planners to have multi-nationalities within the headquarters has partially turned into basic disadvantages especially in the South.

There are logical distribution keys for the individual national assignment derived from the location of the headquarters and the major mission to be completed. For example NATO headquarters Land South-East in Izmir has to organize the land-defence of Turkey. The main burden has to be taken by the Turkish landforces. Therefore the commander is a Turkish 4-star army-general; the majority of staff members serving in this headquarters are Turkish; the rest consists of British, US and Italian assistants. The problem of the obligatory use of English as the common language causes problems everywhere in the South. The tendency, however, that this might be the origin of a re-nationalization of headquarters, remains imminent. More and more national information is circulated amongst the native assistants in their language as an exclusive back-up aside the non-resident staff members and causes step-by-step erosion of the international cohesion. Contingency planning consecutively comprises more national aspects than alliance-wide interests. Otherwise said, national resources, normally earmarked for NATO assignments, may reluctantly be given away for multi-purpose planning, even if the overall objective is to the benefit of the host nation. ▷

One could argue that politicians give up restrictions against multinational procedures and interests as soon as external facts and pressures impound foreseeable disadvantages against their own country. A different political decision is made in a reasonable time, a 'no' is quickly turned into a 'yes'. The complicated military organization, however, cannot react the same speed, even taking into account that vital parts of the mechanism are promptly needed, but still missing. The efficiency of the Southern region command structure, functioning as a whole with all its parts, is therefore somewhat vague.

Improvements

But enough about shortfalls. Let us speak about improvements, because there are improvements.

A shift in strategic interest toward the Mediterranean has taken place during the last several years. It seems that it might be possible to establish some more kind of alliance interest based on the principle of spheres of influence than on areas defined by words of a treaty. This applies vitally to the Mediterranean and its littoral (again the Libyan case). The entrance of Spain into the political structure of the Alliance has set a clear and encouraging signal regardless the fact that former anticipations to the Spanish military contribution had to be reduced.

There has been strenuous emphasis on modernization and sustainability of national military forces being earmarked for NATO assignement.

The basic political problems of the Alliance in Southern Europe are unlikely to change within the foreseeable future. Additionally, there are also basic problems in the military NATO structure of this region. Is there a chance of improvement? The former initiatives of Saceur (General Haig and General Rogers) to get Greece back into the military organization of the Alliance and to reduce the Greek-Turkish tensions, seemed to open a way to a practicable solution. Whether this approach was successful or not, the military solution seems to render the first step to fruitful political discussions

between opponents. Military structures of the Alliance should never be used as a vehicle to solve political procedures. If however, an efficient military organization or any action to a higher efficiency produces political benefits, any chance out of this should be taken.

Within the military structure of NATO in Southern Europe ways of improvements are possible. Improvements of defence capabilities could be envisaged in the Southern region in bolstering NATO abilities to deter threats to security in areas within and beyond NATO boundaries.

The individual nations as well as the Alliance as a whole investigate ways of improvements and try to implement appropriate measures. The major perspectives — identified so far — are the following.

For the ground forces:

- replace or upgrade obsolete equipment;
- provide organic air defence for the ground forces;
- reduce the Warsaw-Pact armoured battle advances;
- balance ammunition stocks and vital supply items to a sufficient extent.

For the maritime forces:

- maintain the freedom of operation through primary seaports of debarkation with sufficient mine-clearing devices;
- limit the losses of reinforcement/resupply shipping;
- be able to collapse the Black Sea fleet's organic air umbrella.

For the air forces:

- improve the air command and control system;
- improve weapon systems for ground-based air defence and interceptors.

Through a wide range of bilateral assistance programs and own national resources the air forces are improved by the procurement of the F-16 aircraft in Greece and Turkey, the Tornado in Italy and the F-18 in Spain.

The navies are improved by new type frigates, destroyers and submarines.

Within the land forces the Turkish upgrade of nearly 3000 M-48 tanks and the procurement of new air defence systems forms the most vital part. But even within this strenuous emphasis of improvements there remains an imminent risk: available funds are channelled into capital investment — prestige subjects — as ships, aircraft and tanks. This may not be wrong, but it is a significant risk which military commanders must make visible.

Timely mobilization and reinforcement, whether for deterrence (deployment of conventional immediate reaction forces) or combat depend on two factors: unambiguous warning delivered in a clear and articulate fashion, and responsiveness of policy-makers who must act upon it.

We must improve both our management of strategic intelligence and the mechanisms by which it is put to use by political authority.

As far as reinforcements in the region are concerned, Saceur has only a modest influence on the course of war. The timely deployment is a part of crisis management; once on the ground, they form a vital contribution but not a decisive one. A short look at the interrelation may give you an idea.

The Portuguese brigade, foreseen for Italy, forms an increase of combat power of one percent, the US amphibious brigade-size formations for Greece — for example — two percent, the 82 ABN Division (US) for Turkey four percent, the 30 (US) Infantrybrigade for Italy additional two percent, the 24 (US) Infantrydivision another five percent. When all preplanned reinforcements are deployed, an increase of nearly 15% throughout the complete land theatre would come into effect. The reaction time, depending on a timely political decision, which can absorb nearly 50 days in total, has to be taken into account. As I said, air force squa-

drons and naval devices can be planned on a more flexible basis.

In conclusion, the military problems might be solved in the long run. Ideally, we should seek to expand the scope of the Alliance to defend each other's national territory into a joint commitment to protect vital — and carefully defined — Western interests beyond national borders. However, the consensus appears to be that such an attempt would be forthwith disastrous, in getting even Greeks and Turks at one table for a common defence concept.

Within this speech, there was not a single word about the international tensions and problems of the Alliance partners in the South. As we have seen, there is a cumbersomeness through the relationship between the Alliance members, the politics of decision-making and an efficient military machinery to implement the political will with a convincing and uncalculable risk for any aggressor. One should be tempted to say that the vital problems in the Southern region are not to be overcome by the Alliance. It would be disastrous for the Alliance as a whole, however, if such a theory would end in a capitulation in front of these problems. The Southern flank is too vital for Europe to be given up. Therefore the only way to go is to keep aware of the problems and to try to achieve a pragmatic step-by-step solution permanently.

This concludes my speech. I guess that I may have provoked a couple of points for contrary discussion. I spoke from the military side of the house. Please keep in mind to wage these special aspects against all the other factors related to the Southern region: politics, economy, ethnic and even religious developments. This however, was not the headline of my briefing.



Die Rolle des Hubschraubers im modernen Gefecht

H.-J. Zeilinger

Oberst i.G., Heeresflieger

Die bestimmenden Elemente des Gefechts, *Feuer* und *Bewegung*, haben seit Einführung des Hubschraubers ständig neue Bedeutungen erlangt. Mit seiner Hilfe wurde zunächst die Beweglichkeit von Einzelpersonen sprunghaft erhöht, dann gaben technische Entwicklung und Verfügbarkeit finanzieller Mittel die Möglichkeit, ihm immer mehr Aufgaben zu übertragen.

Konnten bald Truppen und Material in immer grösseren Mengen mit Transporthubschraubern an ihre Einsatzorte gebracht werden, erhielt das Element Feuer nach der Bewaffnung von Hubschraubern eine neue Dimension. Mit Hubschraubern wie der AH-1 (Cobra) und der Mi 24 (Hind) wurden dann Ende der 60er Jahre erstmals Hubschrauberwaffensysteme in Dienst gestellt, die bereits in ihrer Entwicklung als Kampfhubschrauber konzipiert waren.

Deren Weiterentwicklung hat heute einen vorläufigen Höchststand erreicht mit der Einführung des US Kampfhubschraubers AH-64 (Apache) und dem WP-Kampfhubschrauber Mi 28 (Havoc) —

der im übrigen der AH-64 zum Verwechseln ähnlich sieht. Die bisher vorliegende Informationen lassen erwarten, dass mit Entwicklung eines speziell zum Kampf Hubschrauber gegen Hubschrauber geeigneten Hubschraubers Hokum ein weiterer qualitativer Sprung erfolgen wird.

Mit Hubschraubern ist der Truppenführer heute in der Lage, Operationen zehnmal schneller auszuführen, als mit bodengebundenen Truppen und durch den Einsatz des hubschraubergestützten Feuers kann er im Gefecht Schwerpunkte bilden und verlagern.

Hubschrauber sind jedoch teure Waffensysteme und die Bekämpfungsmöglichkeiten gegen Hubschrauber werden ständig verbessert.

Die Frage nach der „Rolle des Hubschraubers im modernen Gefecht“, nach der Analyse seines Nutzens gegenüber den aufzuwendenden Kosten, wird immer häufiger gestellt. Ich möchte dennoch für meinen Vortrag folgende Eingrenzungen vornehmen.

— Ich möchte heute nicht auf den Aspekt Kosten eingehen, sondern mich ausschliesslich auf die Möglichkeiten, die der Hubschrauber im modernen Gefecht bietet, beschränken.

— Ich möchte den zeitlichen Rahmen, auf den sich meinen Ausführungen beziehen sollen, nicht über das Jahr 2010 hinaus abstecken. Ich meine, dass bis dahin das mögliche Einsatzgebiet, das zu erwartende gegnerische Kräftepotential, die technische Entwicklung bei den Kriegsmitteln, aber auch die eigenen Möglichkeiten und Grenzen realistisch abzuschätzen sind. Darüber hinaus nehmen Spekulation und Unschärfe rapide zu.

Oberst i. G. Zeilinger is in 1941 geboren te Llegnitz, Silezië (thans Polen). Besloot gymnasiumopleiding in 1960. Sederdien militair, aanvankelijk artillerist, sinds 1962 „Heeresflieger“. Van 1964-1970 stude lucht- en ruimtevaart aan de TH München, afgesloten met Ingenieursdiploma. Opleiding tot helikopterpijl 1962/63 (Alouette II), 1970 op UH-1D, 1981 op BO 105; 1984 blindvliegopleiding UH-1D. In 1973/74 opleiding „Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr“. Vervolgens commandant van een vliegtuigtechnische afdeling in een MTH-regiment, afdelingshoofd logistiek en vliegtuigtechniek van de legerluchtmacht, referent voor bewapeningsplanning landmacht, plv C in een at-helikopterregiment en plv C van een „Heeresfliegerkommando“. Seder begin 1986 hoofd van een ministeriële afdeling.

— Der räumliche Geltungsbereich meiner Ausführungen bezieht sich auf das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Das moderne Gefecht (eine Analyse der Bedrohung)

Hauptelement der Bedrohung, der sich die Landstreitkräfte, die in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland stationiert sind, bzw. die für einen Einsatz hier vorgesehen sind, gegenüber sehen sind und bleiben die zahlenmässig überlegenen, qualitativ ebenbürtigen Kampf- und Kampfunterstützungstruppen des Warschauer Paktes.

Ihre Merkmale

- Aus taktisch, operationeller Sicht:
 - eine fortlaufende Verbesserung der Fähigkeit zur Führung des Gefechts der verbundenen Waffen;
 - eine Erhöhung der Stosskraft durch zunehmende Mischung von Kampfpanzern und Schützenpanzern (BMP) bis auf Regiments- und Bataillonsebene in den Angriffsverbänden;
 - die Befähigung zum Führen ununterbrochener Operationen;
 - die Bildung „operativer Manövergruppen“ (OMG), die als frei verfügbare Reserven vorausgeworfen werden können, um ohne Rücksicht auf offene Flanken Schlüsselgelände zu nehmen oder grossräumige Umfassungen einzuleiten;
 - die Zusammenstellung sog. „Luft-/Boden-Stossgruppen“ (etwa Regimentsgrösse), die mit Kampfhubschraubern, Kampfflugzeugen und luftbeweglicher Infanterie einerseits und mechanisierten Verbänden am Boden andererseits im Zusammenwirken mit nichtnuklearen Flugkörpern eingesetzt werden.

- Aus technischer Sicht:

- Panzer mit Panzerungen modernster Technologie (z.B. Aktivpanzerungen);
- verzugsarme Aufklärungssysteme;
- leistungsgesteigerte Zielerfassungs- und Feuerleitsysteme;

— auf Wirkung im individuellen Ziel optimierte Munition grosser Reichweite;

— Ausstattung einer grossen Zahl von Truppen mit Sensoren für den Nachtkampf früher als erwartet.

Die Warschauer-Pakt-Streitkräfte sind darüber hinaus dabei, ihre Luftbeweglichkeit quantitativ und qualitativ erheblich zu steigern durch:

- den neuen schweren Transporthubschrauber Mi 26 (Halo), der 20 t oder 100 Soldaten als Nutzlast aufnehmen kann;
- den weiteren Ausbau ihrer Mi 24 (Hind)-Flotte;
- die Einführung des Kampfhubschraubers Mi 28 (Havoc) noch in den 80er Jahren;
- die Entwicklung und Einführung in den 90er Jahren eines für den Kampf Hubschrauber gegen Hubschrauber optimierten Jagdhubschraubers (Hokum).

Mit diesen Hubschraubern wird der WP in der Lage sein, noch effektiver als bisher:

- taktische Luftlandeoperationen in Einheitsstärke durch die Divisionen bis zu einer Tiefe von 50 km;
- operative Luftlande-Operationen mit den organischen Luftsturmataillonen durch die Armee beziehungsweise mit Luftsturm-Brigaden durch die Front bis zu einer Tiefe von 100 km

in das Gebiet des Verteidigers hinein zu führen.

Zwischenbilanz

Der Warschauer Pakt wird mit panzerstarken, mechanisierten Kräften am Boden und starker Unterstützung aus der Luft schnelle weiträumige Bewegungen mit überraschender Kräftekonzentration an entsprechender Stelle führen, um rasch in die Tiefe vorzustossen.

Die voraussichtlich nur geringe Vorbereitungszeit und der Zwang zur schnellen Reaktion erfordern daher vom Verteidiger: die volle operative Nutzung des Raumes und hoch bewegliche Kräfte.

Die zahlenmässige Unterlegenheit erfordert zum Ausgleich: überlegene Flexibilität/Beweglichkeit.

Operative Absicht des Heeres

Operative Absicht des Heeres ist es, im engen Zusammenwirken von Land- und Luftstreitkräften, die angreifenden Fronten der 1. Staffel im konventionell geführten Gefecht weit vorn abzuwehren und zu zerschlagen.

Die Verwirklichung dieses Konzepts bedingt die Fähigkeit, Schwerpunkte schnell zu bilden und zu verlagern. Dies kann sowohl durch Feuer, wie durch beweglichen Ansatz mechanisierter bodengestützter oder luftbeweglicher Kampftruppen erreicht werden. Diese Kräfte müssen in der Tiefe aufgelockert bereitgehalten, aufgelockert herangeführt, an entscheidender Stelle unter Entwicklung der vollen Stosskraft schnell konzentriert, um danach schnell wieder aufgelockert zu werden. Diese Kräfte müssen neben hoher Beweglichkeit und Feuerkraft über einen hohen Mechanisierungsgrad verfügen.

Ein wesentliches technische Mittel zur Realisierung der Forderungen nach Beweglichkeit und Feuerkraft sieht das Bundesheer im Hubschrauber.

Die Heeresfliegertruppe in der Bundeswehr heute

Lassen Sie mich nun fortfahren mit dem Stand der Auftragserfüllung durch die Hubschrauber der Heeresfliegertruppe der Bundeswehr und zu den begonnenen und beabsichtigten Beschaffungsvorhaben. Ich gehe davon aus, dass Ihnen die derzeitige Ausstattung der Heeresfliegertruppe der Bundeswehr mit fliegendem Gerät bekannt ist.

Verbindungs- und Beobachtungshubschrauber (VHB) (AL III/BO 105 M)

Seine Nutzung für die Aufklärung bleibt noch hinter den Möglichkeiten zurück. Dies ist vor allem auf das Fehlen optischer und anderer Sensoren zurückzuführen. AL II werden bis etwa 1995, BO 105 M bis etwa 2015 im Dienst gehalten werden.

Panzerabwehrhubschrauber (PAH-1) (BO 105 P)

Die Panzerabwehr aus der Luft ist mittlerweile Bestandteil der Operationsführung des Heeres. Die Schwächen des PAH-1 liegen in seiner begrenzten Systemauslegung (Masse-Leistungsbilanz), der daraus resultierenden geringen Reichweite für den Einsatz als operative Reserve des Korps und dem Problem eines für den Nachtkampf und den Selbstschutz zu schaffenden Wachstumspotentials. Kampfwertsteigerungen sind geplant. Mit einer Realisierung der 1. Stufe ist realistischweise nicht vor 1990 (Gewichtsreduzierung/Verbesserung der Auftriebs- und Antriebsleistungen), der Stufe 2 nicht vor 1992 (eingeschränkte Nachtkampffähigkeit) zu rechnen. Der PAH-1 wird auch nach Einführung PAH-2 weiter in der Panzerabwehrrolle verwendet werden, zum Beispiel als Luftkampfmittel der Division.

Leichter Transporthubschrauber (LTH) (UH-1D) und Mittlerer (MTH) (CH-53)

Der Lufttransport mit Hubschraubern wird für die Luftversorgung, sowie für den Transport von Truppen und Personal intensiv genutzt. Durch Einführung von Bildverstärkerbrillen ist eine begrenzte Nachttiefflugfähigkeit erreicht. LTH und MTH sind nicht bewaffnet und haben auch keine Selbstschutzeinrichtungen. UH-1D, seit 1967 im Dienst bei der Heeresfliegertruppe, werden voraussichtlich bis 2010, CH-53, seit 1972 im Dienst, voraussichtlich bis 2015 weitergenutzt werden.

Über diese Planung voraussetzende, kampfwertsteigernde Massnahmen ist derzeit nicht zu entscheiden.

Beschaffungsvorhaben

Neben der Kampfwertsteigerung des PAH-1 sind folgende Vorhaben geplant.

— Ab 1992 Einführung von (54) mit Stinger bewaffneten VBH BO 105 M, die vorrangig als BSH-1 (Begleitschutzhubschrauber 1) zum Schutz vor PAH-1 Operationen gegen feindliche Kampfhub-

schrauber eingesetzt werden sollen, auch im Nachtkampf.

— Ab 1997 (eher später) Einführung eines zusammen mit Frankreich entwickelten Kampfhubschraubers (PAH-2/HAC).

— Die Konzeption eines Escort/Kampfunterstützungshubschraubers für eine Einführung nach dem Jahr 2000. Dieser Hubschrauber könnte zum Beispiel aus dem Basishubschrauber des PAH-2/HAC entstehen.

Die Rolle des Hubschraubers im modernen Gefecht

Im folgenden werde ich mich befassen mit den Einsatzrollen:

- Führung und Aufklärung;
 - Kampf;
 - Kampfunterstützung;
 - Einsatzunterstützung im einzelnen;
 - Einsatz von Hubschraubern im einem luftmechanisierten Kampfverband;
- bevor ich auf die Problematiken:

- Führungssystem;
- Luftraumordnung;

zu sprechen komme, und werde danach mit einer Zusammenfassung meine Ausführung beenden.

Führung

Mit Hubschraubern kann der Truppenführer auf unterstellte Führer und Truppenteile unmittelbar einwirken; es können gestörte oder ausgefallene Verbindungen wiederhergestellt werden.

Führen aus der Luft wird, wie bereits heute, auf Ausnahmefälle beschränkt bleiben, generell werden die genannten Aufgaben angesichts moderner Führungs- und Informationssysteme abnehmen.

Weiterhin wird es vom Hubschrauber aus zu Erkundungen aus der Luft und zu Überwachung von Bewegungen und Massnahmen eigener Truppen kommen.

Aufklärung

Die Aufgabe Aufklärung wird im modernen Ge-

fecht wesentlich mehr als bisher an Bedeutung erlangen.

Aufklärungshubschrauber (Scouts) wirken mit Kampf-Kampfunterstützungs- und Transporthubschraubern zusammen. Aufgrund der von den Aufklärungshubschraubern übermittelten (zeitverzugsarmen!) Ergebnisse können:

- sich Kampf-Kampfunterstützungs- und Transporthubschrauber der Bedrohung durch Feind am Boden und in der Luft weitgehend entziehen;
- Einsätze von Kampf-Kampfunterstützungs- und Transporthubschraubern zeitlich optimiert werden;
- Einsätze von Kampf- und Kampfunterstützungshubschraubern aus optimalen Stellungen erfolgen.

Da Aufklärungshubschrauber am Feind operieren und auch über feindbesetztes Gebiet fliegen können müssen, sollen sie über ein hohes Mass an Agilität und Geschwindigkeit, über Selbstschutzbewaffnung und elektronische Zielaufklärungsmittel und Gegenmassnahmen (EloGM) verfügen.

Kampf

Lassen Sie mich eines vorwegnehmen: *den Anforderungen des modernen Gefechts kann der weitgehend auf sich gestellte, als Abstandskämpfer konzipierte, allein auf die Panzerabwehr optimierte Hubschrauber (PAH) nicht mehr genügen.* Sein Aufgabenspektrum muss erweitert und er muss durchsetzungsfähig und überlebensfähig gemacht werden.

Ein solcher „Kampfhubschrauber“ für das moderne Gefecht muss zu jeder Tageszeit und unter allen selbstverständlich mitteleuropäischen Wetterbedingungen einzusetzen sein. Aus seinen Wirkungsmöglichkeiten im Ziel, das heisst aus der Art der Ziele, lassen sich seine Aufgaben wie folgt ableiten.

Panzerabwehr aus der Luft

Weil der Angriff der WP-Streitkräfte auch in Zu-

kunft mit massivem Einsatz gepanzerter Verbände vorgetragen werden wird, liegt in der Bekämpfung dieser Ziele der Aufgabenschwerpunkt des Kampfhubschraubers. Eine Notwendigkeit, die Beweglichkeit dieses Hubschraubers wesentlich gegenüber bisherigen technischen Möglichkeiten zu erhöhen steht nicht im Vordergrund. Bereits heutige PAH sind um mehrere Größenordnungen schneller als alle bodengebundenen Operationen. In der Phase des Feuerkampfes sind PAH in der Regel gezwungen, künstliche und natürliche Dekungen zu nutzen, das heisst sie führen den Feuerkampf aus dem Schwebeflug.

Um jedoch zu verhindern, dass PAH in immer stärkerer Masse auf ihre Beweglichkeit ausweichen müssen, um sich der wachsenden Bedrohung durch direkte und indirekte Feuer des Feindes zu entziehen, müssen technische Auslegung und Einsatzkonzepte der Kampfhubschrauber darauf ausgerichtet sein, die Überlebensfähigkeit des Waffensystemes über ausgewogene Panzerung so zu gestalten, dass in der entscheidenden Phase des Feuerkampfes die Auftragserfüllung durch Stehvermögen gewährleistet ist.

Hubschrauber/Flugzeugbekämpfung

Die Aufgabe der Hubschrauber-/Flugzeugbekämpfung wird derzeit im Heer wahrgenommen durch: die Heeresflugabwehrtruppe (Gepard, Roland) und durch Fliegerabwehr aller Truppen; in Zukunft soll diese Aufgabe wesentlich verstärkt werden durch den Einsatz des Panzerabwehr-/Hubschrauberabwehr-Kampfwagen (Panther).

Diese Systeme und Verfahren haben den entscheidenden Nachteil, dass sie bodengebunden und daher in ihrer Beweglichkeit den bedrohenden fliegenden Waffensystemen des Gegners weit unterlegen sind. Auch können sie aufgrund begrenzter Stückzahl nicht raumdeckend eingesetzt werden.

Für Operationen der eigenen Heeresflieger ist dieser Nachteil von besonderer Bedeutung. Ihm muss begegnet werden durch eine Selbstschutzbewaffnung eigener Hubschrauber. Selbstschutzbewaffnung wird mitgeführt von Hubschraubern deren Hauptaufgabe nicht die Bekämpfung feindli-

cher Kampfhubschrauber und Luftfahrzeuge ist. Diese Selbstschutzbewaffnung muss im weiten und nahen Entfernungsbereich, aus dem Schwebeflug und aus dem Vorwärtsflug einzusetzen sein.

Diese Forderung ist mit einer Waffe voraussichtlich nicht zu erfüllen. Luft/Luft-Flugkörper zum Schutz gegen die Bedrohung auf grössere Entfernungen einerseits und Ausrüstung mit einer Kanone für den Kampf gegen meist überraschend auftretende Ziele auf kurze Kampftentfernungen versprechen den besten Schutz. Das hohe Gewicht (zumindest derzeit noch) einer Ausrüstung mit Kanone (Waffe und Munition) und die erforderlichen Verstärkungen der Hubschrauberzelle gehen zu Lasten der eigentlichen Missionsausrüstung und sind daher nur bei Hubschraubern mit hohen Abflugmassen zu vertreten.

Hubschrauberjagd

Die Eigenschaften eines Hubschraubers, dessen Hauptaufgabe die Bekämpfung von feindlichen Kampfhubschraubern und Luftfahrzeugen ist, lassen sich am besten in einem auf diese Aufgabe ausschliesslich optimierten Jagdhubschrauber verwirklichen. Ein derartiger Hubschrauber ist einerseits vollkommen an die Einsatzbedingungen des Kampfhubschraubers angepasst, andererseits diesem durch seine Spezialisierung als Jäger überlegen.

Neben seiner Bewaffnung mit Luft/Luft-Flugkörpern und Kanone, wird er über Flugeigenschaften und Flugleistungen verfügen, die ihn befähigen, den feindlichen Hubschrauber abzufangen und seine Waffen aus günstiger Position einzusetzen. Hierzu gehören sicherlich überlegene Geschwindigkeit und hohe Manövrierfähigkeit bei hohen Geschwindigkeiten.

Dieser Jagdhubschrauber wird vor allem aber über Sensoren verfügen, die ihn befähigen, bei jeder Tageszeit und unter allen Wetterbedingungen, den gegnerischen Hubschrauber auf weite Entfernungen (ca. 10 km) zu erfassen (das heisst zu entdecken), zu erkennen, zu identifizieren und zu bekämpfen.

Es wird zu untersuchen sein, inwieweit die Aufgabe Hubschrauberjagd mit den Kräften der Flugabwehr koordiniert werden muss, beziehungsweise ob er nicht in einem eigenen Wirkungsverbund mit diesen Kräften eingesetzt werden wird.

Kampfunterstützung mit Hubschraubern

Pionierunterstützung

Der luftbewegliche Sperreinsatz, bei dem Pioniere mit Sperrmitteln durch Hubschrauber zum Einsatzort transportiert werden und das Verlegen von Minen vom Hubschrauber aus, sind Mittel, Sperren über grosse Entfernungen hinweg schnell anzulegen. Dies wird auch weiterhin Aufgabe von Transporthubschraubern sein.

ABC-Abwehr

Strahlenspüren aus der Luft und Kampfstoffspüren sind Aufgaben, die vom Hubschrauber aus wahrgenommen werden. Insbesondere der Einsatz chemischer Kampfstoffe, mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Merkmal des modernen Gefechts, kann den weitraumigen Einsatz von Hubschraubern stark einschränken. Daher kommt dieser Aufgabe neben seiner allgemeinen (für alle Truppen) eine besondere Bedeutung für Heeresflieger-Operationen zu.

Neben dem Feststellen des Ausmasses einer Vergiftung ist der Einsatz von Hubschraubern zur behelfsmässigen Dekontamination von einsatzwichtigem Grossgerät zur raschen Wiederherstellung der materiellen Einsatzbereitschaft denkbar.

Elektronischer Kampf (EloKa)

Der elektronische Kampf gewinnt auf allen Ebenen zunehmend an Bedeutung. Er wird mit Sicherheit das moderne Gefecht bestimmen. Nachrichten besagen, dass der Warschauer Pakt EloKa-Hubschrauber bereits heute bei jeder grösseren Übung einsetzt. In der Regel kommen hierbei noch Transporthubschrauber mit einer speziellen Missionsausrüstung zum Einsatz.

Eigene Hubschrauber, befähigt zu aktiven elek-

tronischen Gegenmassnahmen, werden ein umfangreiches Aufgabenspektrum vorfinden, das von der Täuschung feindlicher Flugabwehr-Waffensysteme bis zur Störung der gegnerischen Funkkreise reicht. Da diese Hubschrauber in besonderer Masse der gegnerischen Aufklärung ausgesetzt sind, müssen sie über genügend Zuladungspotential zur Mitführung von aktiver Ausrüstung an Täuschkörpern/Scheinzielen und weiterer wirksamer elektronischer Schutz- und Warneinrichtungen verfügen.

Einsatzunterstützung

Lufttransport

Wie bisher werden Lufttransportaufgaben für die Einsatzunterstützung der Bodentruppe durchzuführen sein. Im einzelnen werden:

- leichte Kampftruppen (Fallschirmjäger);
- Teileinheiten der Kampfunterstützungstruppen;
- Fernmeldeteileinheiten (und Material);
- Erkundungskommandos

im Lufttransport in der Regel zur Gewinnung eines Zeitvorteils oder zum Überwinden von Hindernissen an ihre Einsatzorte gebracht.

Verwundetentransport

Mit Transporthubschraubern können Verwundete schnell und schonend zu den Sanitätseinrichtungen gebracht werden. Hierzu werden sie nach einer ersten ärztlichen Versorgung in der Regel mit Leichter-Transport-Hubschraubern soweit vorn wie möglich aufgenommen und unmittelbar zu den Sanitätseinrichtungen gebracht, wo sie umfassend versorgt werden können (Hauptverbandplätze/Lazarette).

Zur effektiven Steuerung des Hubschraubereinsatzes für den Verwundetentransport muss eine entsprechend leistungsfähige Führungsstruktur entwickelt werden. Für den Weitertransport zur abschliessenden Behandlung in Sanitätseinrichtungen in der Rear Combat Zone, beziehungsweise der Verbindungszone werden Transporthub-

schrauber grösserer Zuladungskapazität einzusetzen sein.

Für die Moral der kämpfenden Truppe (siehe auch Falklands, Vietnam) hat dieser Einsatz eine nicht zu überschätzende Bedeutung.

Logistische Unterstützung

Waren es bisher in erster Linie Versorgungsgüter, die als sog. Engpassgüter auf dem Landweg nicht mehr zeitgerecht zum Anforderer gebracht werden konnten, die dann im Lufttransport zugeführt wurden, werden es im modernen Gefecht vermehrt auch noch spezialisierte Instandsetzungs- und Prüfteams sein, die schnell zu wechselnden Einsatzorten gebracht werden können. Diese Aufgabe resultiert aus der absehbaren Entwicklung, dass aus den verschiedensten Gründen ein Bereithalten dieses Personals auf allen Führungsebenen nicht mehr möglich sein wird. Rationeller ist das Bereithalten geringerer Kräfte und Mittel und die luftbewegliche Zuführung zum Ort des Bedarfs.

Logistische Unterstützung mit Hubschraubern muss im modernen Gefecht auch für eingeschlossene Kräfte und über feindbesetztes Gebiet hinweg möglich sein.

Konfiguration un Missionsausrüstung der Transporthubschrauber

Die Aufgaben:

- Lufttransport;
- sanitätsdienstliche Unterstützung;
- logistische Unterstützung;

erfordern Hubschrauber

- einer leichten Klasse (ca. 2 t Nutzlast);
- und einer mittleren Klasse (ca. 8 t Nutzlast).

Diese Hubschrauber werden mit Selbstschutzsystemen, ausgewogener Panzerung und mit Sensoren auszurüsten sein, die den Einsatz unter allen Wetterbedingungen erlauben. Ihre Missionsausrüstungen müssen schnell umgerüstet und den verschiedenen Aufträgen angepasst werden können.

Der NH-90 ist ein Beispiel, wie künftige Transporthubschrauber aussehen müssen.

Einsatz luftmechanisierter Kampftruppen

Habe ich bisher die Rolle des Hubschraubers, das heisst seine Einsatzmöglichkeiten im einzelnen, angesprochen, so will ich kurz etwas zu seinem Wirkungsgrad im Verbund der „luftmechanisierten Kampftruppen“ ausführen.

Luftmechanisierte Kampftruppen bestehen aus luftbeweglichen Bodentruppen und Hubschraubern, die als operative Reserve das „Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen aus der Luft, in der Luft und am Boden, sowohl selbständig, als auch zur Unterstützung der Bodentruppen führen“. Luftmechanisierte Kampftruppen werden gegen den mit Unterstützung der Luftstreitkräfte und Kampfhubschrauber angreifenden gepanzerten mechanisierten Feind in allen Gefechtsarten eingesetzt. Ihre Elemente sind:

- luftbewegliche Aufklärung;
- luftbewegliche Feuerkraft für den Kampf vom Hubschrauber;
- Kampfunterstützung aus der Luft;
- Lufttransportkapazität.

Die Aufklärung erfolgt mit leichten, hochbeweglichen Hubschraubern, ausgerüstet mit weitreichenden Sensoren, im engen Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Aufklärungsmitteln des Heeres. Ihr Auftrag ist es:

- Lage und Absicht des Feindes aufzuklären;
- mit dem Feind Fühlung zu halten;
- Luftkampfelemente an den Feind heranzuführen.

Dieses Konzept wurde zuerst von den USA und Frankreich entwickelt.

Kampf und Kampfunterstützung aus der Luft erfolgen im wesentlichen durch Kampfhubschrauber, darüber hinaus durch Kampfunterstützungs-, beziehungsweise Jagdhubschrauber. Die Kampfhubschrauber sind das entscheidende Mittel des luftmechanisierten Kampfverbandes. Zusammen

mit Bodentruppen oder selbständig werden sie Feindkräfte in der Tiefe des Raumes oder im Zuge der FLOT zerschlagen.

Der luftmechanisierte Kampfverband wird auch in bestimmten Lagen Teile der bodengebundenen Kampftruppen zeitlich begrenzt zu führen haben. Ausserdem werden in ihm Transporthubschrauber zur sanitätsdienstlichen und logistischen Unterstützung integriert, beziehungsweise ihm für den Einsatz unterstellt.

Kern der luftmechanisierten Kampftruppen des Heeres könnte konkret das Waffensystem sein, das jetzt noch unter der Bezeichnung PAH-2 bekannt ist.

Führung

Die vielfältigen Aufgaben des Hubschraubers im modernen Gefecht erfordern ein entsprechendes Führungssystem. Die bisher verwandten Führungsmittel und -verfahren sind hierfür nicht mehr geeignet. Entscheidend für den effektiven Einsatz von Hubschraubern im modernen Gefecht — und diese Bedingung nimmt exponential im Verhältnis zu der den Hubschrauber gefährdenden Bedrohung zu — ist die Verfügbarkeit verzugsarmer Aufklärungsdaten, aktuellen Daten über Luftlage, Luftraumordnungsmassnahmen, Wetter, sowie über die allgemeine Lage der Heeresfliegertruppenteile und der sie unterstützenden Führungsmitteln, die über gesicherte Verbindungen, weitgehend störicher (data-burst) zu einem Heeresfliegerführungs- und Informationssystem integriert werden, das den effektiven Einsatz der Kampfunterstützungs- und Transporthubschrauber sicherstellt.

Dieses System muss mit den Führungs- und Informationssystemen des Heeres (Heros), aber insbesondere mit denjenigen der Heeresflugabwehrtruppe und der Integrierten Luftverteidigung (LV) dialogfähig, das heisst kompatibel sein.

Es muss untersucht werden ob im Gefecht der Zukunft nicht die auf den Luftkampf optimierten Hubschrauber und die Kräfte und Mittel der Flugabwehr zu einem Wirkungsverbund zusam-

mengefasst werden können und sollen. Noch vor der Erfüllung dieser Forderung müssen alle eigenen Hubschrauber mit einem sicheren, passiven Freund-Kennsystem ausgerüstet werden.

Luftraumordnung

Ich möchte meine Ausführungen nicht beenden, ohne das Problemfeld „Luftraumordnung“ angesprochen zu haben. Um den schnellen Abläufen des modernen Gefechts oder verbundenen Waffen und den Forderungen an schnelle Koordination der Land- und Luftoperationen gerecht zu werden, bedarf es zusätzlich eines aufgabengerechten Führungs- und Informationssystems zur Regelung der Ordnung im gefechtsfeldnahen Luftraum.

Über dieses System müssen alle Nutzer des Luftraums verbunden sein. Das System muss über eine hohe Flexibilität zur Reaktion auf Lageveränderungen und über grosse Schnelligkeit zur Übermittlung entsprechender Befehle verfügen. Ebenso muss das System über ein direktes, aktives, technisch verzugslos arbeitendes, Elektronische Gegenmassnahmen-resistentes Freund-Kennsystem mit hoher Erkennungssicherheit zur Identifizierung bemannter und unbemannter Systeme verfügen.

Die Ordnung des Luftraums, im besonderen des gefechtsfeldnahen Luftraums gewinnt in zunehmendem Masse eine neue Qualität. Das in der Vergangenheit weitgehend zweidimensionale Gefechtsfeld der Landstreitkräfte erweitert sich zu einem dreidimensionalen Gefechtsraum. Die Luftraumordnung tritt gleichwertig neben die Raumordnung am Boden.

Dies bedeutet dass, um den Herausforderungen des Modernen Gefechts und den Erfordernissen gemeinsamer Land-/Luftkriegoperationen im Rahmen der Gesamtverteidigung Rechnung zu tragen, der Truppenführer (des Heeres!) für beide die Verantwortung tragen muss.

Entscheidend wird sein, inwieweit auf diesem Problemfeld bündnisgerechte, für alle Teilstreitkräfte akzeptable Lösungen gefunden werden können. ▷

Schlussbemerkungen

Ausgehend von einem modernen Kriegsbild, das gekennzeichnet sein wird von raschen Gefechtsabläufen, weitgehendem Fehlen einer geschlossenen Frontlinie, dafür von Gefechts-handlungen in der gesamten Tiefe des Raumes, kommt dem Hubschrauber — zumindest bis zum Aufkommen völlig neuer Kriegsmittel — auf absehbare Zeit sowohl für einen möglichen Angreifer, wie für den Verteidiger zunehmende Bedeutung zu. Nur mit Hubschraubern wird der Truppenführer in dem heutigen und dem in realistischer Zeit zu erwartenden modernen Gefecht reagieren können, wird er in die Lage versetzt, Feuer auch über grosse Entfernungen hinweg schnell an Brennpunkten des Geschehens zusammenzufassen, um es danach ebenso schnell wieder an einem anderen Ort zur Wirkung zu bringen. Voraussetzungen für den operationellen Nutzen von Hubschraubern in der

von mir genannten Rolle in einem modernen Gefecht sind allerdings:

- die Schaffung eines Heeresflieger-eigenen Aufklärungsführungs- und Informationssystems als Voraussetzung, um Waffen zur Wirkung, Truppen und Material sicher und schnell zum Einsatzort zu bringen;
- die Herstellung der Dialogfähigkeit mit den entsprechenden Systemen der Flugabwehr und der integrierten Luftverteidigung;
- die Einigung auf eine „moderne Luftraumordnung“;
- die Akzeptanz des Einsatzes von Hubschraubern als Ausweg aus dem Dilemma Auftragserfüllung bei knapper werdenden Haushaltsmitteln und den verständlichen Partikulärinteressen anderer Truppengattungen des Heeres und der Teilstreitkräfte. Damit habe ich jetzt doch noch die Kosten erwähnt.